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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF PROPERTY
BY WILLIS H. ELLIS*
I. INTRODUCTION
The volume of business brought before the Colorado Supreme
Court is greater than that of most other state supreme courts, and
is increasing. Many of the comments made herein about particular
decisions are critical. The criticism should rightfully be directed,
as well, to the system that has left our supreme court the only ap-
pellate tribunal for almost all of the judicial determination made
throughout the entire state. The court simply does not have time
to do the job it should, and would like to do, with the cases that
come before it. Its function is too important to let it continue under
this burden. Serious consideration should be given to an intermedi-
ate appellate court that would let the supreme court fulfill its
greatest duty of deciding those important and difficult cases that
are not routine, by exercising a discretionary jurisdiction.
Only those cases that seem to add something new to the law
of property, or contain statements or holdings that the author con-
siders questionable are discussed herein.
II. TAX DEED
A. Virgin Title Doctrine
In 1938 U.S. Highway 6 was constructed around the town
of Silver Plume. Since the old road had been the main street of the
town, a connection between the main street and the new highway
was needed. Acquisition of the necessary land was entrusted to
an employee of the town. Apparently the employee failed to pur-
chase the land or a right-of-way across it, but the connecting road
was built just the same. Construction was done under an arrange-
ment between the town, the county and the state of Colorado.
For more than twenty years this connecting road was used
by the public without any suggestion that the town did not own
the right-of-way. In 1960 one of the plaintiffs attempted to block
the road. When the town refused to allow this, legal action resulted.
In Town of Silver Plume v. Hudson,1 the plaintiffs claimed
title under a tax deed from the county executed in 1945. The town
claimed a public highway by twenty years adverse use under a
1953 statute, applying specifically to public rights-of-way.
2
The trial court held that the public had not used the road ad-
versely the requisite twenty years because between 1938 and 1945
the County of Clear Creek held a tax certificate for the land in
question, and it was not until 1945 that the plaintiff took from the
county by treasurer's deed. There could be no adverse use against
the county because the county had cooperated in constructing the
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Low.
1 380 P.2d 59 (Colo. 1963).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 120-1-1 (1953). This section provides in pertinent part: "The following ore
hereby declared to be public highways: . . . . (3) All roads over private lands that have been
used adversely without interruption or objection on the part of the owners of such lands for twenty
consecutive years."
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highway. Adverse use began in 1945 when the plaintiffs took by
tax deed, and in 1960 sufficient time had not elapsed to create an
interest in the town.
The Supreme Court of Colorado rejected this reasoning. The
judgment was reversed on the basis of two holdings: (1) A tax
certificate (as distinguished from a tax deed) does not pass title,
and thus the county was never the owner of the land in question;3
and (2) the doctrine that a tax deed creates a new title unaffected
by defects in the previous chain does not apply to a public highway
obtained under the provisions of Colo. Rev. Stat. 120-1-1 (1953).
The virgin character of a valid tax deed was established early.4
An exception was recognized for mineral interests transferred prior
to the tax deed. 5 Now there is a new exception for public highways
obtained by adverse use. Because no reason is given for this new
exception, it is difficult to know whether other similar exceptions
can be expected in the future.
It is not difficult, however, to guess the reason for the Silver
Plume decision. It was a "hard case." The plaintiffs were attempt-
ing to block public access to a street that was the chief avenue into
town from the highway. Presumably the plaintiffs knew of the
street when they took the tax deed, and had no expectation of ac-
quiring the land free of this burden. The entire situation smacks
of opportunists discovering a "legal technicality" and trying to
use it to hold up the public as a windfall for themselves.
Although we may applaud the court for reaching the decision
it did, we nevertheless wish that guidelines had been drawn by
which to judge the future of the tax deed doctrine. The conclusion
that is drawn after the Silver Plume case is that tax deeds create
new titles unaffected by occurrences in the previous chain except
in hard cases, highways obtained under Colo. Rev. Stat. 120-1-1
(1953) and mineral right transfers. Of course the future may bring
120-1-1 cases in which there would be nothing shocking or hard
in applying the tax deed doctrine, but the court would now seem
stuck with the Silver Plume holding so far as 120-1-1 cases are
concerned.
One might wonder whether saving the town of Silver Plume
the expense of condemning a right-of-way was worth unsettling
the tax deed doctrine.
B. Effect Upon Boundary Dispute
There has been one other recent case concerning the doctrine
that tax deeds create a new title. Williams v. Wilk 6 was a contest
between two adjoining land owners. For some fifty years a building
had stood on defendant's land, with two pilasters supporting one
wall encroached on plaintiff's lot. Plaintiff sued to have the pilas-
ters removed. Defendant's answer was, of course, adverse possession
of the land upon which the pilasters had stood for over fifty years,
and the plaintiff's reply was that a tax deed in defendant's chain
3 Although the court cited no authority for this proposition, it seems to have been recognized
for some time in Colorado. Rach v. Fastenou, 122 Colo. 41, 219 P.2d 781 (1950); Morris v. St. Louis
Nat', Bank, 17 Colo. 231, 29 Pac. 802 (1892).
4 Jacobs v. Perry, 135 Colo. 550, 313 P.2d 1008 (1957); Harrison v. Everett, 135 Colo. 55,
308 P.2d 216 (1957); Henryln Irr. Dist. v. Patterson, 65 Colo. 385, 176 Poc. 493 (1918).
5 Mitchell v. Espinosa, 125 Colo. 267, 243 P.2d 412 (1952).
6 368 P.2d 558 (Colo. 1962).
VOL. XL
PROPERTY
of title less than eighteen years before suit, wiped the slate clean
and destroyed the adverse possession upon which the defendant
relied. Presumably on the basis of this reply the trial court held
for the plaintiff and ordered the pilasters removed.
The reply was clearly inappropriate. The tax deed was in de-
fendant's chain of title while the land that defendant claimed by
adverse possession was in the plaintiff's chain of title. Therefore,
the tax deed that plaintiff claims wiped out the title by adverse
possession, did not describe the land adversely possessed. It gave a
"new" title in the land described, but certainly not in any other land.
This defect in the reply was demonstrated to the supreme court
by the defendants,7 but the court expressly refused to either accept
or reject the argument. Instead the court referred to the general
statute of limitations upon recovering the possession of real estate,
Colo. Rev. Stat. 118-7-1 (1953), and stated that this statute had run
and thus the plaintiff could not recover possession of the land upon
which the pilasters stood.
In effect this amounted to holding for the defendant on the basis
of its argument of adverse possession, and completely ignoring both
7 Id. at 560.
One thin dime
WILL BUY-
A cup of coffee ... a candy bar.., or, a pair of shoelaces.
A dime will also buy enough
NATURAL GAS to:
" dry 10 loads of wash in a clothes dryer
" operate your furnace for 5 hours on a cold night
" keep your water heater perking for 30 hours
" or, run your gas range for about 5 days.
SMALL WONDER WE SAY NATURAL GAS
IS STILL ONE OF YOUR BIGGEST BARGAINS
IN MODERN LIVING.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO
an investor-owned utility
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DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
the defense and the reply to it.8 One could logically infer that the
court was rejecting the tax deed doctrine for all cases, since that
was the defense which the court chose to ignore. However, it seems
safe to say that the court intended no such implication.
III. TRUST DEED
Set-Off in "foreclosure proceeding"
Robinson and Riepen entered into an arrangement whereby
Riepen would operate Robinson's uranium mine. As a part of the
deal Riepen loaned Robinson $6,660.00, and took a promissory note
for that amount from Robinson. The note was to mature in five
years but would not be payable as long as the mining agreement
was still in full force and effect. As security for the note, Robinson
executed a trust deed on certain real estate.
Riepen apparently failed to carry out the mining operations
according to the contract, and shortly before the note matured he
permanently changed his domicile from Colorado to Arizona. When
Robinson defaulted on the note, Riepen asked the public trustee to
sell the real estate which he held as security. Two days before the
actual sale Robinson filed this rather unique law suit: Riepen v.
Robinson.9 In his complaint Robinson sought to enjoin the trustee's
sale, and to "set-off" his damages because of the alleged breach of
the mining agreement, against Riepen's recovery from the trustee's
sale. In fact Robinson claimed that his damages would amount to
more than his debt to Riepen, and asked that, therefore, the sale be
permanently enjoined and the trust deed canceled.
No injunction was issued, and the public sale was held on
schedule over the protests of Robinson. The property was purchased
by a third party for more than the amount owed. Robinson then
asked that his damages be adjudicated, and if found to exceed the
amount of the note held by Riepen, that the trustee's sale be set
aside. Service of process was made on Riepen by mail at his new
residence in Arizona. Riepen appeared specially and moved to quash
service. The trial court overruled the motion, upholding its juris-
diction, and Riepen brought an original action in the supreme court
under rule 106 asking the trial judge to show cause why motion to
quash should not be sustained.
Although there had been no personal service on Riepen in
Colorado, the supreme court discharged the rule to show cause,
without opinion, thereby upholding the trial court's jurisdiction. 10
The trial court's answer to the order to show cause argued that it
had jurisdiction without personal service in Colorado because the
8 To make the opinion even mare confusing, the court said that it did not have to decide
,,pon the defense of adverse possession either:
Though there may be merit to defendant's argument as to the nonapplicability of Harrison
[case holding that tax deed gives a new title] it is unnecessary to consider either it or the
defense of adverse possession, because their defense is clearly substantiated by CRS '53
118-7-I. ...
Williams v. Wills, 368 P.2d 558, 560.
The statute relied upon by the court is one of the principal statutes defining adverse possession
in Colorado. If the plaintiff's suit was barred by this statute, it must follow that the defend-
ant had obtained title by adverse possession.
At least one modern writer has argued that in boundary disputes the doctrine of adverse
possession should be treated as nothing more than a statute of limitation upon suits to recover
the possession of real esate, thus eliminating such problems as the character of the possession, etc.
It seems too much to hope that the court had this development in mind in writing this opinion.
See Callahan, Adverse Possession (1961).
9 372 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1962).
10 Riepen v. District Court of Larimer County, Colo. Supreme Court Docket No. 19583, (1960).
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proceeding was in rem and asked for a set-off in the trustee's sale,
which was analogized to a mortgage foreclosure. The fact that the
trustee's sale was not a judicial proceeding at all did not seem to
deter the court from accepting the argument.1 At this point the
plaintiff's theory of set-off was the same theory which the court
later held could not be brought in a mortgage foreclosure (or
analogous proceeding).
Its jurisdiction over the complaint having been affirmed by the
supreme court, the trial court proceeded to try the substantive
issues. It found that Riepen had in fact breached the mining agree-
ment, and that Robinson's damages did exceed the amount of Robin-
son's debt to Riepen. It, therefore, ordered the trustee's sale set
aside and the note canceled. The supreme court then reversed this
judgment on the basis of the general rule that a set-off will be
allowed in a mortgage foreclosure only if the amount of the set-off
is liquidated' 2 It was apparently admitted by all parties that the
Robinson claim was unliquidated.
Counter actions are generally divided into set-off and recoup-
ment. "Set-off" is the term used to describe claims (often restricted
to contract) that do not arise out of the same transaction that gave
rise to the principal action. Since a set-off will require a trial of
issues extraneous to the principal action, it is generally limited to
liquidated claims.' "Recoupment" is the term used for claims that
do arise out of the same transactions as the principal claim, and
since the issues tried are all connected, recoupment is usually al-
lowed for unliquidated as well as liquidated claims.14 Robinson's
contract claim in this case arose out of the same transaction that
gave rise to the note and trust deed. If the court had treated the
claim as a recoupment, it might have been able to view the matter
differently.
Indeed, if we accept the court's own statement that it reversed
the trial court because Robinson's claim was unliquidated, we have
a rather surprising example of judicial administration. The question
of jurisdiction was before the supreme court, before the trial, in the
original proceeding under rule 106. In affirming the trial court's
decision overruling the motion to quash, the court must have been
sustaining jurisdiction on some basis. The Robinson claim was un-
11 The holding, although unsupported by reasons, has interesting implications. On the basis of
the result reached one could argue that a trustee's sale in Colorado which is not a judicial proceeding
will nevertheless support ancillary jurisdiction.
12 The court cited, 37 Am. Jur. Mortgages § 728, 1941, in support of the general rule. Actually, the
rule applies to set-offs in general and not just set-offs in a foreclosure proceeding.
13 City of Grand Rapids, Mich. v. McCurdy, 136, F.2d 615 (6th Cir. 1943); Pennsylvania R.R.
v. Miller, 124 F.2d 160 (5th Cir. 1941); Francisco v. Francisco, 120 Mont. 468, 191 P.2d 317 (1948);
Stern v. Sunset Road Oil Co., 47 Cal. App. 334, 190 Poc. 651 (1920); Lysle Milling Co. v. North
Alabama Grocery Co., 201 Ala. 222, 77 So. 748 (1918).
14 Crossett Lumber Co. v. United States, 87 F.2d 930 (8th Cir. 1937); Curtis.Warner Corp. v.
Thirkette, 99 N.J. Eq. 806, 134 Atl. 299 (1926); Alley v. Bessemer Gas Engine Co., 228 S.W. 963 (Tex.
1921); Lysle Milling Co. v. North Alabama Grocery Co., 201 Ala. 222, 77 So. 748 (1918). See the
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liquidated at this point, and if it could not be brought as a set-off
and properly attached to the "foreclosure" proceedings, this would
have destroyed the court's jurisdiction then and there. After the
substantive issue of breach of contract was tried Robinson's dam-
ages were no longer unliquidated. They had been judicially found
to exceed the amount of the secured note. After the primary reason
for not allowing an unliquidated set-off (the trying of extraneous
issues in an unliquidated claim) had been obviated by actually con-
ducting the trial, and after the damages were no longer unliqui-
dated, the court decided the whole thing had been a mistake and
held that since it shouldn't have been done in the first place it would
have to be undone now.
This kind of jurisdiction is subject to some degree of judicial
discretion, and one would think that after the issues had been fully
tried with the blessing of the supreme court, that discretion would
be exercised in favor of the alleged set-off. Especially since courts
have often exercised their discretion in favor of a true set-off on the
sole ground that the person against whom the set-off was brought
could not otherwise be sued in the jurisdiction. 15 This was, of course,
such a case.
When we bring the various threads of this case together we find
that there was questionable jurisdiction to begin with since there
was no judicial proceeding to support the "set-off," and the require-
ments of rule 102 had not been complied with.16 Jurisdiction having
been asserted, the suit was finally not allowed because of the general
rule that a set-off must be of a liquidated amount. The entire chain
of events is distressing since this was not properly a set-off but a
recoupment which can be allowed for unliquidated damages (except
that there were no action here to attach it to). But in addition, the
damages were liquidated at the time of the supreme court's decision.
However, the propriety of a set-off or counter-claim was not the
primary issue presented by the situation. The plaintiff was seeking
to set aside the trustee's sale not merely to try a counter-claim with
it. Thus, the difficult question of the protection to be accorded the
reliance of purchasers at a tax sale was potentially involved. The
decision to set a trustee's sale aside would seem to require stronger
provocation than the decision to try a counter-claim with it.
The court properly pointed out that if the plaintiff's suit was
not even a proper set-off it was certainly not grounds for setting
the sale aside.' 7 But since the statement about a proper set-off is at
least questionable, perhaps the issue of setting the tax sale aside
could have been profitably discussed.
IV. DESCRIPTION IN DEED
Result of Erroneous Federal Survey
The court reached a puzzling result in Ashley v. Hill,is assum-
ing that all the operative facts are set out in the opinion.
15 Heller & Co. v. Lindsay, 146 Colo. 452, 361 P.2d 979 (1961); Plattner Implement Co. v.
Bradley Alderson & Co., 40 Colo. 95, 90 Pac. 86 (1907). This argument was made to the court
for the first time in the petition for rehearing. Record, vol. 2, p. 1, Plaintiff's petition for rehearing,
Riepen v. Robinson, 372 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1962).
16 The plaintiff might have viewed the defendant's interest in the trustee's sole as property
and attached such interest under rule 102 of the Colorado rules of civil procedure. If the plaintiff
had complied with the requirements of rule 102, jurisdiction in rem could have been acquired.
17 375 P.2d 337 (Coo. 1962).
18 Ibid.
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In 1883 a federal survey and plat were completed. In 1887 a
federal patent was issued to the plaintiff's ultimate predecessor in
title. The description was taken from the 1883 survey and included a
certain millsite. In 1904 a federal patent was issued to the defend-
ant's ultimate predecessor in title, and presumably the description
was also taken from the 1883 survey since there was no other survey
in existence at that time. In 1927 a new federal survey was made
showing that the survey of 1883 was incorrect. Using the correct
1927 survey the millsite was not on land described in the patent
taken by plaintiff's predecessor, but rather on land described in the
patent granted to the defendant's predecessor.
Apparently subsequent deeds in both plaintiff's and defendant's
chains of title simply copy the descriptions found in previous deeds,
even after the new survey of 1927. Thus, in 1960 the situation was
that plaintiff had record title to land which according to the 1883
survey included the millsite, and which under the 1927 survey did
not include the millsite. Defendant had record title to land which
under the 1927 survey included the millsite and which under the
1883 survey did not. It is admitted that the 1927 survey is correct.
Both parties ask that their alleged interest in the millsite be quieted.
The trial court found for the defendant.
In affirming judgment for the defendant the supreme court
made its decision a foregone conclusion by the way in which it put
the issue before it:
The question for determination is whether a land re-
survey which established that an error was made in the
legal description of the millsite in a United States patent
which was issued under an earlier survey, worked an ouster
of a subsequent patentee and his successors in interest of
that portion of real property conveyed by a later patent
which is embraced within the corrected description of the
millsite.11"
By asking whether anything occurred to oust the defendant
rather than asking whether anything happened to oust the plaintiff,
the court seems to have started with the assumption that the de-
fendant has a better right. The opinion does not indicate who, if
anyone, was in possession of the millsite, and possession was not
made an issue in the case.
On the basis of the facts recited in the opinion it seems that
both of the original patents were based upon the 1883 survey, which
was the only one in existence at that time. Thus, the intent of
grantor and grantee in both cases can only be determined by look-
ing at the 1883 survey.
Whether this survey was correct or not, it was the survey the
original parties looked at to determine how to describe the land
they intended to convey. It seems clear, then, that the patent
granted to the plaintiff's predecessor was intended to describe land
containing the millsite. It is difficult to know how that land ever
got into the defendant's chain of title. If the decision is not a mis-
carriage of justice, the justification for it does not appear in the
opinion.
The case would seem to stand for the proposition that the
19 Ibid.
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description in a deed means what the latest (and presumably cor-
rect) survey says it means rather than what the parties thought it
meant at the time they executed the deed. We trust, however,
that the case will not be successfully cited in support of such a
proposition.
V. CHATTEL MORTGAGE
Interest of Mortgagee in the Property Mortgaged
The defendant purchased an automobile and gave a note and
chattel mortgage which were purchased by plaintiff. Defendant
defaulted on the note, was granted a discharge in voluntary bank-
ruptcy proceedings, and then lost the automobile in an inaccessible
canyon in Utah. Although the loss of the automobile was not due to
defendant's negligence, the chattel mortgage recited that defendant
would not take the vehicle out of Colorado without he mortgagee's
permission. Defendant did not obtain such permission. The plaintiff
was granted permission to sell the automobile to pay the amount
of the note, but with the virtual destruction of the car (apparently
without adequate insurance coverage), the plaintiff was trying to
hold the defendant liable for the value of the car despite the dis-
charge. The court, in Finance Corp. v. King,20 held that the note was
discharged in the bankruptcy proceedings, and that the defendant





The decedent widow had eleven children. She deeded the family
ranch to one of the children shortly before she died. This grantee
was the only child still living at home at the time. The other chil-
dren sought to set the deed aside on the grounds that the grantee
exercised undue influence on their mother at a time when she was
ill and unable to form the necessary intent to transfer the land.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and the supreme court
20370 P.2d 432 (Colo. 1962).
21 The arguments of plaintiff, which were rejected by the court, were: (1) The defendant is a
trustee for the plaintiff because he took the car out of Colorado in violation of the chattel mortgage;
(2) That the defendant having defaulted prior to the bankruptcy proceeding, title to the car vested
in plaintiff, subject only to defendant's right of redemption, and defendant therefore held car as
trustee for plaintiff; (3) Even though obligation on the note was discharged, in the bankruptcy
proceeding, the defendant was still liable for the security either by returning it to plaintiff or
paying its value.
KELLY GIRLS * Skilled * Tested * Bonded
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affirmed.2 2 The supreme court held that the fact that defendant had
possession of the deed was prima facie evidence of delivery, putting
the burden of proving nondelivery upon the plaintiffs.
2 3
Plaintiffs tried to rely upon the general rule that " . . . Where
a fiduciary relationship is shown to exist between parties to a trans-
action and the fiduciary is enriched thereby, the law presumes that
the transaction was produced as a result of undue influence on the
part of the fiduciary .... .. 4 The supreme court held that no
fiduciary relationship exists between mother and son under normal
circumstances, as here. The plaintiffs were unable to produce evi-
dence of lack of competence in their mother.
VII. RESTRICTIVE COVENANT SPECIFICALLY ENFORCED
In Smith v Nelson,2 the court affirmed.a judgment specifically
enforcing a restrictive covenant in defendant's chain of title. The
suit was successfully brought by neighbors whose property was
subject to similar covenants. The restrictions concerned the distance
of buildings from front and side lot lines; the number of residences
per lot; the cost of buildings and square feet contained within each
building. The court rejected defenses of waiver and laches because
the plaintiffs had complained to the defendant as soon as they
learned of his building plans, and because suit was filed promptly.
VIII. TORT
Duty of Property Owner re Condition of Street Adjoining
Owner's Land
A motion for summary judgment was granted and affirmed in
Ellsworth v. Colorado Beverage Co. 2 6 The plaintiff claimed dam-
ages for personal injuries allegedly suffered when he slipped on
the icy street immediately adjacent to a building owned and oc-
cupied by defendants. There was no sidewalk between the street
and defendants' building, and defendants' customers parked on this
portion of the street. Plaintiff was a business invitee of the de-
fendants, and was injured while getting out of his car which was
parked on the street adjacent to defendants' building. Plaintiff did
not claim that defendants had caused ice to be on the street, but
rather that they had failed to remove it or warn business invitees
of it.
The court distinguished the case from Sill v. Lewis,2 7 in which
the property owner's premises were so constructed as to discharge
water upon the street where it froze, and the injured plaintiff was
allowed to recover.
IX. EMINENT DOMAIN
It has long been held that one whose property is cut off from
a reasonable access by the vacation or barricading of a street is
22White v. White, 368 P.2d 417 (Colo. 1962). Also discussed in Yegge, One Year Review of
Civil Procedure and Appeals, 40 Denver L.C.J. 66, 86 (1963), and Cantwell, One Year Review of
Wills, Estates and Trusts, 40 Denver L.C.J. 122, 124 (1963).
23This portion of the holding was based directly upon Colo. Rev. Stat. 118-6-1(4) (1953).
24 368 P.2d 417, 419, citing Lesser v. Lesser, 128 Colo. 151, 250 P.2d 130 (1952), and Hilliard
v. Shellabarger, 120 Colo. 441, 210 P.2d 441 (1949).
25 368 P.2d 556 (Colo. 1962).
26 370 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1952).
27 140 Colo. 436, 344 P.2d 972 (1959).
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entitled to compensation. The courts have experienced difficulty
when only one of two or more means of access is blocked. It has
generally been held that the property owner who is left in a cul de
sac by the closing of one end of his sole avenue of access is entitled
to such damages as he can prove.
28
In Colorado a property_ owner was allowed to recover from a
private corporation which constructed railroad track and facilities
that blocked his principal and only convenient access to the down-
town area.2 9 The fact that plaintiff could get into his property did
not prevent his recovery.
This area has been developed further in a recent case. In
Gayton v. Department of Highways,30 the supreme court affirmed
the dismissal of a complaint which alleged that the only access to
plaintiff's property was an alley and that one of the two ends of the
alley had been permanently blocked by the defendant. The com-
plaint failed to allege facts which would show special as opposed to
general damages. Special damages are damages greater than those
accruing to the community in general from the change.
The difference between the facts in Gayton and the first Colo-
rado case mentioned,31 where recovery was allowed, is the difference
between blocking one of two equally convenient access routes, and
blocking the only convenient route. The plaintiff, in Colorado, must
plead and prove injury amounting to more than a reduction of the
number of reasonably convenient means of access. He must show
a detrimental change in the kind of access, to the point at which
the court will say that his access has been made unreasonably diffi-
cult. And if he does not plead this he is subject to a motion to dis-
miss for failure to state a cause of action.
X. ZONING
In the area of zoning the court reaffirmed its position in several
cases that zoning is an administrative function, and that the courts
will review the zoning agency's determinations only for abuse of
discretion. Board of County Comm'rs v. Shaffer -3 2 and Denver v.
American Oil Co.3 3 were discussed in this year's review of constitu-
tional law.
3 4
In one other case, however, the court held that the district
court in reviewing a determination of the Zoning Commission could
hear new evidence that had not been before the Commission, on the
question of whether the plaintiff's constitutional rights had been
violated by the zoning regulation as applied to him. In Morris v.
Board of County Comm'rs,35 the plaintiff claimed that the Jefferson
County Planning Commission had approved his plan, but that the
county commissioners had denied it. Plaintiff claimed to be deprived
of his constitutional rights in that the zoning regulations placed
28 For collected cases see Annot. 93 A.L.R. 639 (1934) supplementing 49 A.L.R. 330 (1927).
29 Denver Union Terminal Ry. v. Glodt, 67 Colo. 155, 186 Pac. 904 (1920).
30367 P.2d 899 (1962). The procedural aspects of the dismissal of the complaint in this case
are discussed in Yegge, One Year Review of Civil Procedure and Appeals, 40 Denver L.C.J. 66, 74
(1963).
31 Supra note 29 and accompanying text.
32 367 P.2d 751 (Colo. 1962).
33 374 P.2d 357 (Colo. 1962). To the same effect is Levy v. Board of Adjustment of Arapahoe
County, 369 P.2d 991 (Colo. 1962).
34 Gitelman, One Year Review of Constitutional Low, 40 Denver L.C.J. 134, 151 (1963).
35 370 P.2d 438 (Colo. 1962).
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upon his land deprived him of the only reasonable use to which
it could be put.
The plaintiffs filed the action in the District Court of Jefferson
County to review the action of the county commissioners and to
seek a declaratory judgment stating their right to construct the
facilities under question. Plaintiffs sought to introduce evidence
which had not been before the county commissioners and the dis-
trict court refused to hear it. The supreme court, in reversing, held
that the new evidence should have been heard in connection with
th request for a declaratory judgment.
Judicial review of an administrative zoning decision apparently
goes beyond looking for an abuse of the discretion of the zoning
authority on the basis of the record before it, where a constitutional
claim is made. The claim that a zoning decision denies all reason-
able use of certain land is treated as a constitutional claim, and it
seems inevitable that the courts should have the last word on what
use is reasonable. It is to be hoped, however, that the good start
the court has made in leaving zoning to the agencies that have the
technical competence and continuing interest in it, will be continued
and that only a clear denial of constitutional rights will justify a
judicial reversal of the administrative determination.
One question has apparently been ignored in the Morris opin-
ion. The case was remanded to the district court to hear additional
evidence on a constitutional question which boils down to a question
of fact that is clearly within the zoning authority's competence, i.e.
can the plaintiff put his land to any reasonable use other than the
forbidden use?
When the constitutional quesiton is based upon a determination
of facts not within the agency's competence-e.g. the constitution-
ality of the statute creating the agency and giving it its powers-
there may be good reason for not letting the agency make the
initial decision. But when the question, as here, is one within its
competence, the agency should hear the evidence and make the
first determination. Specifically in the Morris case the county com-
missioners should be allowed to make their decision on whether the
plaintiffs can make more than one reasonable use of this land. If
there is new evidence on this question, the case should be remanded
to the commissioners rather than to the district court.
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PLAINTIFF'S ADVANTAGEOUS USE OF DISCOVERY,
PRE-TRIAL AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT
By WILLIAM H. ERICKSON*
Counsel for the plaintiff has a veritable arsenal of discovery
weapons available to him, which he should employ early in every
case. Full use of the discovery procedure often results in summary
judgment on all or many issues, facilitates the most expeditious use
of a pre-trial conference, assists the trial judge in limiting the issues,
and simplifies the problems of the trial court.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938, provided
the first comprehensive discovery rules in the United States. After
the adoption of the Federal Rules, thirty-four states significantly
enlarged their discovery procedures.1 Now, nearly one-half of the
states have adopted rules which are identical to or closely patterned
after the Federal Rules and contain similar discovery rights.2
Therefore, today's plaintiff's counsel, except in state courts where
discovery rights are not governed by these discovery procedures,
is only concerned with the proper use of Rules 26 to 37 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure. Where liberality in discovery does
not exist under state procedure, the plaintiff's counsel has good
reason to file his complaint in the federal court whenever possibleY
In Colorado, the plaintiff has even broader rights of discovery
in the state court than he does in the federal court, because he is
allowed to take the deposition of the adverse party at any time after
he commences the action by the service of summons or the filing of
a complaint. 4 Under the Colorado Rules, which are almost identical
to the Federal Rules, it is also possible to take the adverse party's
deposition before a complaint is filed and to tailor-make the com-
plaint to the adverse party's deposition, which often leads the plain-
tiff to an early summary judgment.5 The best use of discovery
depends, of course, upon the circumstances of each case, but in all
cases, wise use of the discovery rules will prevent the fox and
hound surprise tactics that were formerly a part of every trial.6
Partner in the Denver firm of Hindry, Erickson and Meyer.
1 1 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, §§ 9.1 - 9.53 (1961); Weinstein, Gleit &
Kay, Procedures for Obtaining Information Before Trial, 35 Texas L. Rev. 481 (1957).
2 Wicker, Tactical Advantages from the Use of Discovery, 27 Tenn. L. Rev. 323 (1959).
3 See Oil Tank Cleaning Corp. v. Reinauer Trans. Co., 149 F. Supp. 41 (D.N.Y. 1957), where the
court declared it to be common knowledge that federal discovery procedure was more liberal than
New York practice. In the State of Kansas, the plaintiff has limited deposition rights in the
state courts and can only invoke full discovery in the federal courts. Slough, Trial Preparation Under
the Kansas and Federal Rules: A Contract, 4 Kan. L. Rev, 58 (1955).
4 Colo. R. Civ. P. 3 Commencement of Action. (a) How Commenced. A civil ocion is commenced
(1) by filing a complaint with the court, or (2) by the service of a summons. The complaint must
be filed within 10 days after the summons is served, or the action may be dismissed without notice,
and in such case the court may, in its discretion, if it shall be of the opinion that the action was
vexatiously commenced, tax a reasonable attorney's fees as costs in favor of the defendant, to be
recovered by the plaintiff or his attorney. (b) Time of Jurisdiction. The court shall have jurisdiction
from the time of filing the complain or service of the summons.
5 Colo. R. Civ. P. 26 Depositions Pending Action. (a) When Depositions May Be Taken. After
jurisdiction has been obtained over any defendant or over property which is the subject of the
action the testimony of any person, whether a party or not, may be taken at the instance of any
party by deposition upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of discovery
or for use as evidence in the action or for both purposes. The attendance of witnesses may be
compelled by the use of subpoena as provided in rule 45. Depositions shall be taken only in
accordance with those rules. The deposition of a person confined in prison may be taken only
by leave of court on such terms as the court prescribes.
6 Note, Developments n the Low - Discovery, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 940 (1961).
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I. SCOPE OF PRE-TRIAL DISCOVERY-RULE 26 (b)
The breadth of discovery under Rules 26 to 37 is measured by
Rule 26 (b), which provides the following criteria:
*.. any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action .... including
the existence, 'description, nature, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents, or other tangible things
and the identity and location of persons having knowledge
of relevant facts. It is not ground for objection that the
testimony will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony
sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
ery of admissible evidence.
The interpretation of the breadth of discovery under Rule 26
(b) was before the Supreme Court of the United States in Hickman
v. Taylor.7 That classic case gave birth to the term "work product
of the lawyer," and declared the limits of discovery in the follow-
ing language:
[T] he deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a
broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the time-hon-
ored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to preclude a party
from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's
case. Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered
by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end,
either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever
facts he has in his possession, before the trial . . .thus re-
ducing the possibility of surprise. But discovery . . . has
ultimate and necessary boundaries. As indicated by Rules
30(b) and (d), limitations inevitably must be imposed
when it can be shown that the examination is being con-
ducted in bad faith or in such a manner as to annoy,
embarrass or oppress the person subject to the inquiry.
And as Rule 26 (b) provides, . . .when the inquiry touches
upon the irrelevant, or encroaches upon the recognized
domains of privilege.
The pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism estab-
lished by Rules 26 to 37 is one of the most significant inno-
vations of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Under the
prior federal practice, the pre-trial functions of notice-
giving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation were per-
formed primarily and inadequately by pleadings. Inquiry
into the issues and facts before trial was narrowly con-
fined and was often cumbersome in method. The new rules,
however, restrict the pleadings of the task of general
notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process
with a vital role in the preparation for trial. The various
instruments of discovery now serve (1) as a device, along
with the pre-trial hearings under Rule 16, to narrow and
clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a
device for ascertaining the facts, or information as to the
existence or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues.
Thus civil trials in the federal courts no longer need to be
7 329 U.S. 495 (1947). See Harv. L. Rev. 269 (1948).
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carried on in the dark. The way is now clear, consistent
with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the full-
est possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.8
The full scope of the pronouncement in Hickman v. Taylor is
not easily determined. The issue before the court involved the im-
proper use of Rule 33 to secure the statements of witnesses which
the Supreme Court classified as the work product of the lawyer.
The Court held that statements of witnesses obtained by counsel
prior to the institution of an action were outside the proper scope
of examination and could not be obtained unless good cause was
shown. Technically, the decision established a guide to the dis-
cretion granted the trial court in denying discovery under Rule
30 (b). In determining whether a court will exercise that discretion
and grant discovery, two questions must be answered: First, are
the materials sought the type which the court endeavored to pro-
tect? If so, prima facie, discovery should be denied. Secondly, even
though the materials are of the crucial type and involve the work
product of the lawyer, is discovery necessary for an effective and
just disposition of the cause? If the answer is affirmative, the
moving party has shown good cause and should be entitled to ob-
tain discovery.9 Thus, even the lawyer's work product is not beyond
the limits of proper discovery.
Liberality of discovery is the keystone of justice. In Professor
Moore's summary of the benefits of the discovery procedure, the
plaintiff's counsel finds support for the broad use of rules of dis-
covery which will aid in the quest for truth and result in speedier
justice. Professor Moore said:
1. It is of great assistance in ascertaining the truth and
in checking and preventing perjury.
2. It is an effective means of detecting and exposing
false, fraudulent, and sham claims and defenses.
3. It makes available in a simple, convenient, and
often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could not
have been proved, except with great difficulty and some-
times not at all.
4. It educates the parties in advance of trial as to the
real value of their claims and defenses, thereby encouraging
settlements out of court.
5. It expedites the disposal of litigation, saves the time
8 Id. at 500-1, 507-8 (1947). See also Lucas v. District Court, 140 Colo. 510, 345 P.2d 1064
(1959) where insurance policy limits were made available by discovery, when the court said,
"relevant to the subject matter" does not require that the evidence sought be admissible.
9 In Walsh v. Northern Greyhound Lines, Inc., 244 Wis. 281, 12 N.W.2d 20 (1943), it was held
that there was sufficient reason for discovery, when it was alleged that the person making the
statement was under sedatives at the time she was questioned, that she was questioned until
exhausted, and believed the statement contained inaccurate information. In Bearor v. Koppel,
24 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1940) discovery was allowed when plaintiff stated that he was ill when the
statement was taken, and that he was coerced with threats of being put in jail if he didn't sign
the statement. The court has also held that discovery was proper in Toftegoard v. Hart, 100
N.Y.S.2d 729 (1950), upon a showing that defendant's agent coerced the plaintiff into signing
the statement without an opportunity to read the statement, and plaintiff did not receive a copy of
the statement. On plaintiff's affidavit that he had grounds for believing the statement had been
fraudulently altered, the court allowed discovery in Nedimyer v. The Pennsylvania R.R., 6 F.R.D.
21 (1947). Again, in a suit against the United States for damages arising out of a military plane
crash it was held that the nature of the accident, the difficulty of obtaining information as to
the cause of the accident, the lapse of time and the fact that the witness was still in the military
service was good cause for allowing discovery. Brauner v. United States, 10 F.R.D. 468 (1950).
Similarly, in Roach v. Boston Tow Boat Co., 19 F.R.D. 267 (1956), discovery was ordered when
the witnesses stated that their memories had been exhausted and that the statements would refresh
their recollection. See also note, Discovery: Work Product and Good Cause Development Since Hick-
man v. Taylor 36 Ind. L.J. 186 (1956).
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of the courts, and clears the docket of many cases by settle-
ments and dismissals which otherwise would have to be
tried.
6. It safeguards against' surprise at the trial, prevents
delays, and narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried,
thereby expediting the trial.
7. It facilitates both the preparation and the trial of
cases.' 0
In obtaining oral depositions and admissions of fact, and in sub-
mitting interrogatories to the adverse party, plaintiff's counsel must
await the passage of the statutory period of time before seeking
discovery. When the time limitations on the plaintiff's right to dis-
covery expire, the discovery rules are self-executing and do not
require action by the court. An over-zealous plaintiff may find that
his premature attempt to obtain discovery is thwarted by a motion
for a protective order under Rule 30 (b) or a motion to terminate
or limit examination under Rule 30(d). Abuse of discovery rights
afforded to a plaintiff will find the court listening sympathetically
to the defendant's motion." Judge Kauffman has suggested that the
appreciation of the judicial sanctions which may be carried out
under the authority of Rule 37, if discovery is denied, cause the
attorneys for both sides to cooperate.
12
10 4 Moore, Federal Practice 1014-I016 (2d ed. 1962). See also Estes, Discovery and Motions
Practice, 29 F.R.D. 280 (1962).
11 Plaintiff's Discovery Timetable Under the Federal Rules
Depositions on oral interrogatories (Rule 30).
When: At any time after commencement of action. If within first 20
days, leave of court must be obtained.
From whom: Any person, party or witness.
Notice: Reasonable notice must be given all parties, and notice must
be given whether deponent is party or witness. Reasonable
notice is not less than 5 days. Moore, 30.03.
Subpoena: Required for witnesses; not required for parties.
Objections and orders for
protection of parties: To be made promptly.
Motion to compel answers: To be heard by court on reasonable notice.
Depositions on written interrogatories (Rule 31).
Substantially the same as depositions on oral interrogatories.
Cross-interrogatories: Within 10 days after service of direct.
Redirect interrogatories: Within 5 days after service of cross.
Recross interrogatories: Within 3 days after service of redirect.
Interrogatories to the parties (Rule 33).
When: At any time after commencement of action. If within first 10
days, leave of court must be obtained.
From whom: Parties only.
Time to obiect: Within 10 days after service.
Time to answer: Within 15 days after service.
Motion to compel answers: To be heard by court on reasonable notice.
Inspection and copying of documents and things (Rule 34).
When: At any time after commencement of action. Motion must be
heard on reasonable notice and good cause must be shown for
production of documents.
From whom: Parties only.
Physical and mental examinations (Rule 35).
When: At any time after commencement of action. Motion must be
heard on reasonable notice and good cause shown for the
physical examination.
From whom: Parties only.
Requests for admissions (Rule 36).
When: At any time after commencement of action. If within first 10
days, leave of court must be obtained.
Time to object, admit or deny: Must answer or object within period set forth in notice, which
cannot be less than 10 days.
12 Kaufman, Judicial Control of Discovery, 28 F.R.D 37, 111 (1961). But see, Speck, The Use of
Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 Yale L.J. 1132 (1951).
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II. DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION-RULE 30 (a)
The oral deposition is the plaintiff's sledge hammer in every
case. Under Rule 30(a), a party may examine any person on oral
deposition without leave of court, except that Rule 26(a) requires
the plaintiff to obtain leave if his notice of the taking is served
within twenty days after the commencement of the action. Before
the examination, Rule 30 (b) provides that any party or the person
to be examined may apply to the court for a protective order to
prevent the taking of the deposition or to limit the scope of the
examination or otherwise avoid "annoyance, embarrassment, or
oppression." During the taking of the deposition, if a party or de-
ponent objects to any question, his objection is recorded in the
testimony taken, subject to the objection. However, the party or
deponent may demand, under Rule 30(d), that the taking of the
deposition be suspended for such time as may be necessary to
allow him to apply to the court for an order terminating the exam-
ination or limiting its scope. An order obtained under Rule 30 (d)
is only granted when it can be shown that the examination is being
conducted in bad faith or in such a way that it will "unreasonably
annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party .... "In prac-
tice, the courts have seldom found that the questions propounded
in the taking of a deposition would not lead to the discovery of
MENEM ~ ~~.~ . ....
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admissible evidence and have held that objectionable inquiries
could be dealt with at time of trial.
13
All lawyers agree that the deposition should be taken in a
manner which will obtain the greatest amount of information for
use at the time of trial, as well as for use in connection with a
motion for summary judgment or request for admission or as a
wedge to force a limitation of issues at the pre-trial conference.
From the plaintiff's standpoint, he desires to take the first deposi-
tion. If he is able to question an opposing party or hostile witness
before his own client is examined, he can then study the defendant's
version of the facts and better prepare his client for his all-impor-
tant deposition.1
4
Priority of discovery represents a substantial tactical advantage,
not only for a party who will deliberately change his story, but also
for an honest party. Priority of notice has been the basis for de-
terminating priority of discovery in many cases. 15 The rule of pri-
ority was formulated to protect the defendant until he could get a
lawyer, but in practice it furnishes the defendant with a head start
in the discovery race. Thus, while the plaintiff is hamstrung by the
twenty-day time limitation of Rule 26 (a), he may be served with
either interrogatories, requests for admissions, or a notice to take
deposition, which will prevent him from exercising any right of
discovery until the defendant has fully explored his case.1 6 The rule
is fundamentally unfair, because the plaintiff has the burden of
proof and must be prepared to sustain his complaint against the
defendant's motions and at the time of trial.
The rule of priority has had various inroads made upon it by
judicial determination that the party having the right of priority has
lost his right by undue delay or bad faith.'7 The courts have also
been sympathetic in ordering that depositions be taken simultane-
ously or alternately.'8
Most lawyers find that opposing counsel will cooperate and
stipulate, in writing, as required by Rule 29, that a deposition may
be taken at a certain time and place before a particular court re-
porter or notary public. In the event counsel will not agree, the
13 See United States v. Cotton Valley Comm., 75 F. Supp. 1 (1948); Grinnell Co., Inc. v.
National Bank of Far Rockaway, 1 F.R.D. 767 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); DeSeversky v. Republic Aviation Corp.,
2 F.R.D. 113 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); Mackerer v. New York Cent. R.R., 1 F.R.D. 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1940). See
also Discovery Procedure Extended, 25 Fordham L. Rev. 553 (1957); Van Cise, Depositions and
Discovery, Rules 26 to 37, 28 Dicta 375 (1951); Tactical Use and Abuse of Depositions Under Federal
Rules, 59 Yale L.J. 117, 138 (1949).
14 Fowler, Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 Tenn. L. Rev. 475 (1959).
15 See, e.g., Reading-Sinram-Streat Coals, Inc. v. Metropolitan Petroleum Corp., 21 F.R.D. 333
(S.D.N.Y. 1958); 4 Moore, Federal Practice § 26.13 2d ed. 1962. The priority principle is not limited
to depositions but applies to other discovery devices as well, in so far as it protects the party
having deposition priority from his opponent's attempts to invoke any device while the depositions
are being taken. See cases cited note 16-18 supro. However, the party first serving interroga-
tories (which the plaintiff may do without leave of court after only ten days) does not thereby
acquire priority for the purpose of taking depositions. Dow Chem. Co. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 26
F.R.D. 179 (D.Del. 1960).
16 See, e.g., Shulman, Inc. v. Shertz, 18 F.R.D. 94 (E.D.Pa. 1955). But cf. Kurtt M. Jachmann
Co. v. Marine Office of America, 16 F.R.D. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). See Sanib Corp. v. United Fruit Co.,
19 F.R.D. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); B & B Theatres Corp. v. Atlanta Enterprises, Inc., 22 Fed. R. Serv. 306.33
(N.D.Ga. 1956). See E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 25 F.R.D. 237
(D.Del. 1959); Technical Tape Corp. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 18 F.R.D. 318 (S.D.N.Y. 1955)
(production of documents).
17 Kurt M. Jachmann Co. v. Hartley, Cooper & Co., 17 F.R.D. 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Carribean
Constr. Corp. v. Kennedy Van Saun Mfg. & Eng'r. Coro., 13 F.R.D. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
18Caldwell-Clements, Inc. v. McGraw-Hill Pub. Co., 11 F.R.D. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1951). See Arm-
strong v. Doyle, 20 Misc.2d 1087, 193 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1959). In Huber Baking Co. v. Frank C.
Sparks Co., 45 Del.-525, 76 A.2d 125 (Super. Ct. 1950), aff'd on reh., 46 Del. 153, 81 A.2d 132
Super. Ct. 1951), a party was compelled by court order to allow one of his witnesses to be
examined out of the presence of other witnesses.
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simple notice provided by Rule 30(a) may be utilized, and the
notice may even be supplemented by a request for the production
of documents, which may serve as a subpoena duces tecum, in the
event the adverse party does not find reason to seek the protective
provisions of Rule 30 (b).11 To be certain that all documents will be
available for examination during the time that the deposition is
taken, the plaintiff should supplement his notice to take deposition
with a subpoena duces tecum to require the production of docu-
ments under Rule 45 (d) ,20 which may be obtained without a show-
ing of good cause by merely moving ex parte for an order for the
issuance of the subpoena.
In taking the deposition of the adverse party, the plaintiff
should consider the use which he intends to make of the deposition.
If the deposition is to be used for impeachment purposes only, the
foundation required by Rule 26 (d) for use as evidence at the time
of trial need not be laid. However, if any question exists as to the
availability of the witness or the party at the time of trial because
of age, sickness, or infirmity, or because of his transient nature, the
better practice is to lay the foundation which would enable the
examining party to offer the deposition as evidence at the time of
trial.
21
The advantages lying behind the proper use of the deposition
technique are many. Through the deposition, the plaintiff may
ascertain whether he has properly joined and named all of the de-
fendants. He may obtain admissions which will serve as a substitute
for other proof. He may inquire about the identification and de-
scription of all relevant documents, so that he may particularize his
designation of documents when he moves for the production of
documents under Rule 34. He can tie down, or freeze, his opponent's
version of the facts and examine his opponent as a witness. A prop-
erly taken deposition will perpetuate testimony that may be used
as evidence under Rule 26(d). A well taken deposition will help
locate all probable witnesses and expose contentions of the defend-
ant that have not been the subject of prior investigation. When a
deposition has been taken, the issues are clarified and narrowed and
the plaintiff is in a position to fully appraise his case for either
settlement or trial.22 Of course, the key use of depositions is for
cross-examination and impeachment, and once the deposition is
taken, surprise is eliminated at the time of trial.23
III. DEPOSITIONS OF WITNESSES UPON WRITTEN INTERROGATORIES-
RULE 31
In planning discovery, the plaintiff will seldom have occasion
to use Rule 31, which is cumbersome and difficult to use because all
19 4 Moore, Federal Practice, § 26.10 (2d ed. 1962); Shenker v. United States, 25 F.R.D. 96
(1960), reviews the background of a notice to produce which is served as part of the notice to take
deposition. Originally, the notice was honored because a subpoena duces tecum under Rule 45(d)
was an empty formality. Rule 37(d) imposes no sanctions for a failure to comply with the notice;
Smith v. Bentley, 9 F.R.D. 489 (1949).
20 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1005 (1961); Moore, Federal Practice
34.02-45.05 (2d ed. 1962), points out that Rules 34 and 45 must be read together and that Rule
34 should control production of documents by a party before trial. See Jack Loeks Enterprises, Inc.
v. W. S. Butterfield Theatres, Inc., 20 F.R.D. 303 (D.Mich. 1957); Hickey v. United States, 18
F.R.D. 88 (D.Pa. 1952).
21 Winner, The Discovery Procedure in General Practice, 12 Wya. L. J. 231 (1957).
22 Insurance companies carefully examine depositions before making settlement. Low, How to
Prepare and Try a Negligence Case 69 (1957).
23 Erickson, Depositions Limited or Unlimited, ABA Sect. Ins. N & CL, 333, 337 (1957).
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interrogatories have to be served in advance and before the inter-
rogatories are propounded to the witness by the reporter. With
such a limitation, counsel must anticipate what the answers will
be to the direct, cross, redirect, and recross interrogatories which
are provided for in the rule. The crystal ball requirements of Rule
31 limit the use to the occasion when a witness is a great distance
from the court and the cost of taking an oral deposition is not justi-
fied by the particular case. As an added disadvantage, counsel may
not with propriety review the answers to the interrogatories with
the deponent, even if the deponent happens to be a party or a
friendly witness.2 4 However, a saving feature is contained in Rule
31 (d). On motion, by a party or the deponent, prior to examination,
the court may order, if good cause is shown, that the deposition be
taken upon oral examination.
IV. INTERROGATORIES TO PARTIES-RULE 33
An adverse party may also be examined under Rule 33 through
interrogatories submitted directly to him for answer under oath,
commonly with the direct assistance of counsel. If the party being
interrogated objects to any question, he may apply to the court for
appropriate relief when he can show good cause for the entry of a
protective order under Rule 30(b). The number of interrogatories
allowed the plaintiff under Rule 33 is not expressly limited, and
each case must be examined to determine whether the plaintiff has
acted reasonably under the circumstances in propounding inter-
rogatories.
The rule applies only to adverse parties, and most courts have
held that adverseness must appear from the pleadings. Unless a
claim has been made by one party against the other, adversity is
lacking.
2 5
Rule 33 has its greatest force when a corporate defendant is
involved. An interrogatory propounded under Rule 33 will require
the corporate defendant to ferret out any facts, regardless of their
location, and supply the information requested in the interroga-
tory.26 The defendant must supply the plaintiff with clerical work
when questions are asked that require the compiling of statistics,
accounts, or figures that are located in different reports, offices, and
files.27 Moreover, the interrogatories to a corporate defendant may
be introduced in evidence at the time of trial under Rule 26 (d).
Answers to interrogatories are often resourcefully prepared by
defense counsel to be noninformative to the questions propounded, 2
but Rule 33 carries with it a "continuing duty" for the defendant
to assure the truth of the answers to interrogatories propounded
up to the time of trial. Typically, the question giving rise to the
duty to respond presents itself in a personal injury case when the
plaintiff or defendant serves an interrogatory asking for the names
244 Moore, Federal Practice 31.02, at 2153 (2d ed. 1962). Homdi & Ibrahim Mango Co. v.
Fire Ass'n., 20 F.R.D. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
25 See Kestner v. Reading Co., 21 F.R.D. 303 (E.D.Pa. 1957); M.V.M., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 20 F.R.D. 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); Harlan Produce Co. v. Delaware, L. & W.R.R., 8 F.R.D. 104
(W.D.N.Y. 1948); 71 Harv. L. Rev. 734 (1958).
26 Robbins v. Brockton St. Ry., 180 Mass. 51, 61 N.E. 265 (1901).
27 See Fowler, Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 Tenn. L. Rev. 475, 481
(1959).
28 See Fowler & Sokolow, Discovery Proceedings Under the Federal Rules, 3 Prac. Law Institute
Monograph (1955).
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and addresses of witnesses to the accident and thereafter the inter-
rogated party, having surrendered all the names he had at the time,
subsequently discovers another witness. At the time of trial the
testimony of the surprise witness will provoke objections of bad
faith and unfair surprise. The courts, in examining similar circum-
stances, have held that the defendant has a continuing duty out of
common fairness to inform the plaintiff of the newly discovered
witness.
29
The limited cost of interrogatories and right to follow interroga-
tories with an oral deposition make the use of Rule 33 all but a
mandatory requirement for plaintiff's counsel in every case.
V. DISCOVERY AND PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS AND THINGS FOR
INSPECTION, COPYING, OR PHOTOGRAPHING--RULE 34
Under Rule 34, a party may for good cause move that the court
direct any other party to produce documents or tangible things for
inspection before trial. Similarly, a party may obtain permission
of the court to enter upon land or other property of another party
in order to inspect or photograph the premises or "any object or
operation .... " Rule 34 incorporates the general discovery scope
of Rule 26 (b) and contains four general requirements which must
be met by plaintiff's counsel as a condition precedent to the pro-
duction of any given document:
1. "Good cause" must be shown for the production of a
document.
2. It must be "relevant to the subject matter involved in
the pending action."
3. It may not be "privileged."
4. It must be in the "possession, custody, or control" of the
person or party from whom the document is sought to be
produced.
The rule is limited to parties and cannot be used to obtain docu-
ments in the possession of a witness.
The plaintiff has the obvious limitation in using Rule 34 that
he does not have in using Rule 45 (d) when he seeks the production
of documents in taking a deposition of an adverse party because
the plaintiff, in utilizing Rule 34, has the burden of showing good
29 McNally v. Yellow Cab Co., 16 F.R.D. 460 (E.D.Pa. 1954); White Tower Management Corp.
v. Erie Main Corp., 28 N.J. Super. 425, 100 A.2d 775 (1953); See also, Grauman, Deposition and
Discovery, 47 Ky. L.J. 175 (1959).
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cause, and the burden is reversed when the adverse party seeks a
protective order to avoid producing documents which have been
subpoenaed for a deposition under Rule 45 (d) .0
Thus, document discovery differs significantly from discovery
through depositions, interrogatories, and admissions by placing on
the parties seeking disclosure the onus of going to court in the first
instance and establishing a right to the information. Necessarily,
much must be left to the discretion of the trial court in determin-
ing what constitutes good cause in the circumstances of a particu-
lar case.' It has been held that Rule 34 should be liberally con-
strued 2'-2 However, shot gun requests for the production of docu-
ments will not be honored, and it is better practice for the plaintiff
to determine the documents which he requires with specificity by
the use of either interrogatories or depositions.13 Great controversy
has arisen around attempts to obtain: (1) the reports of experts,
(2) the written statements of the plaintiff which were obtained by
a claims adjuster, (3) the defendant's income tax returns, and (4)
his insurance liability policy. 4 The mere allegation that the docu-
ments sought are material and relevant will not sustain the plain-
tiff's burden in seeking an order under Rule 34.35
The ease of discovery by deposition or interrogatory causes the
plaintiff to avoid the. necessity of going forward with proof of good
cause for the production of documents until he has exhausted his
other remedies. Usually, counsel for the defendant will stipulate as
to the production or examination of most documents and things and
will only require Rule 34 to be used when the instruments or docu-
ments sought are indeed necessary to the proof of the plaintiff's
case. In such a case, Rule 34 becomes a necessary and useful tool to
prepare for trial.
VI. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION-RULE 35
Whenever the physical or mental condition of a party is in
controversy, the court may, upon a showing of good cause, direct
that party to submit to a physical or mental examination by a
physician under Rule 35. A violent controversy existed as to the
dangers and the inherent unconstitutionality of the rule when it
was adopted, but it has been upheld"6 and has not been abused in
practice.
The rule casts the burden of showing good cause upon the
party seeking the examination, but in practice a physical exam-
ination is agreed to without a hearing. When a physical examina-
tion is granted, Rule 35 (b) grants unto the party examined the right
to request and receive a "written report of the examining physician
setting out his findings and conclusions."
Rule 35 (b) seems to be weighed in favor of the plaintiff at first
blush, but if the plaintiff requests a copy of the report of the physi-
30 Moore, Federal Practice, 26.10 (2d ed. 1962), suggests that the in pari material construction
of the Rules closes the door to the use of Rule 45(d) unless good cause is shown. See United
States v. 6.82 Acres of Land, 18 F.R.D. 195 (D.N.M. 1955).
31 Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 796 (1961).
32 Lindsay v. Prince, 8 F.R.D. 233 (N.D.Ohio 1948).
33 United States v. American Optical Co., 2 F.R.D. 534 (S.DN.Y. 1942); See also, Ronan, Desig-
nation of Documents Under Rule 34, 25 Ins.L.J. 313 (1958); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 1135 (1949).
34 See Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure 796-798 (1961).
35 Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. E. F. Drew & Co., 13 F.R.D. 127 (D.C.Del. 1952).
36 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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cal examination conducted by the defendant's physician, he thereby
unequivocally makes all medical reports which he has acquired
from his own physician, or which he may obtain in the future,
available for examination by the defendant. Thus, Rule 35 (b) is a
two-edged sword, and the plaintiff may find that the court excludes
the testimony of the physicians who have prepared his own medical
reports if he fails to make the reports available to the defendant.
37
Moreover, Rule 35 (b) (2) provides that the plaintiff also waives any
privilege which he might have if he either requests a copy of the
examination ordered under Rule 35 or takes the deposition of the
examiner.
Often a controversy arises as to the manner in which the exam-
ination will be conducted, and many plaintiffs take the position that
they will not be examined outside of the presence of their counsel.
Needless to say, the doctors do not favor the presence of counsel
during the examination, and the question of the plaintiff's right to
insist upon his lawyer's presence during the examination has re-
sulted in divergent views. The leading federal case is Dziwanoski
v. Ocean Carriers Corp.38 in which the defendants were sustained in
their contention that the presence of the plaintiff's attorney during
the examination would interfere and hinder the physician in con-
ducting his examination. The court, in the Dziwanoski case, held
that no useful purpose would be served by the presence of counsel,
and that proper objection could be made at the time of trial if the
physician improperly inquired into facts on which legal rights were
based. The decision rested on the impartiality of examining doctors
and recognized that the plaintiff could, in a proper case, have his
own doctor present during the examination if he felt it necessary.
Many decisions are contrary to the Dziwanoski case and recognize
the right of the plaintiff to have his lawyer present during the ex-
amination to afford protection against improper questions which
might be propounded by the examining physician as to the history
of the accident or other legal matters.39 However, the plaintiff
should consider whether he loses more than he gains by having
counsel present. Obviously, the presence of counsel may tend to
create hostility in the examining doctor, and result in an unfiair
appraisal of the plaintiff's physical condition. Moreover, it must be
conceded that plaintiff's counsel can protect the plaintiff against a
physician's questions which delve into the history of the accident
by writing out a brief description of the occurrence complained of
so that the examining doctor may fairly determine whether a casual
condition exists between the injury and the conduct of the de-
fendant.
A physical examination assists a plaintiff in a personal injury
action because it enables the defendant's lawyer and the defendant's
insurance carrier to fully appraise the injuries which the plaintiff
has suffered and to determine what would be a proper settlement
value. Most defense lawyers will not settle a serious personal injury
37 See, Barnet, Compulsory Medical Examinations Under the Federal Rules, 41 Va. L. Rev. 1059
(1955).
38 26 F.R.D. 595 (D.Md. 1960).
39 Sharff v. Superior Court of the City and County of San Francisco, 44 Col.2d 508, 282 P.2d
896 (1955); Francisco v. Hoffman, 74 Ohio L. Abs. 420, 131 N.E.2d 692 (1955); Kelley v. Smith
Oby Co.. 70 Ohio L. Abs. 202, 129 N.E.2d 106 (1954); Williams v. Chattanooga Iron Works, 131
Tenn. 683, 176 S.W. 1031 (1915); see Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 822.2
(1961).
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action until an up to date medical report has been obtained on the
plaintiff's condition. Therefore, even though Rule 35 directs that a
physical examination may be permitted, counsel for the plaintiff
generally cooperate and allow defense counsel to have such physical
examinations conducted as may be necessary in the light of each
particular case.
VII. ADMISSION OF FACTS AND OF GENUINENESS OF
DOCUMENTS-RULE 36
To further buttress the plaintiff's case, requests for admissions
may be served which must be answered within the ten-day limita-
tion of the rule, with a "sworn statement denying specifically the
matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in detail
the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters."
Unless the defendant admits or denies the request made, the facts
set forth in the request are "deemed admitted."
The Rule 36 procedure for "admission of facts and of genuine-
ness of documents" is not, strictly speaking, a discovery device. 40
The rule assumes that a litigant already knows certain facts which
enable him to avoid the necessity of proof by obtaining admissions
from his adversary.
4'
The limited use of the rule is in part due to the weakness of its
sanction. 42 Rule 37 imposes strong sanctions for failure to comply
with the other discovery rules, but the only penalty for unreason-
able denials of an admission requested under Rule 36 is an order
to pay the cost incurred in making the proof. Substantial sums have
been assessed under Rule 37 (c), but the sanction deters only fla-
grant denials. 43 Although the risk involved in Rule 36 denials is
light, the consequence of failing to make any response to a request
for admission may be severe because the matter in question is then
deemed to be admitted under Rule 36 (a).44 Moreover, the defendant
cannot obtain ex parte extensions of time to answer a request for
admissions and can only gain an enlargement of time by motion and
notice to the adverse party. Objections can be made, but notice must
be served with the objections; even then the basis for objections is
clearly set out in the rule and is limited to privilege, relevance, and
the form of the request. The defendant may answer, fail to answer,
or may answer the request without complying with the oath re-
quirement of Rule 36 (a) and thereby open the door to summary
judgment by the admissions thus obtained.
A controversy also reigns as to the effect of Rule 36 admissions
in "estopping the answering party to take a different position at the
trial. '45 Parties have been relieved from improvident admissions
by showing good cause in advance of trial, but the relief has only
40 United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 25 F.R.D. 203 (S.D.N.Y.
1960); Conway, Admissions of Fact Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 26 J.B.A.D.C. 421,
422 (1959).
41 Knowlton v. Atchison, T. & S.F.Ry., 11 F.R.D. 62 (D.Mo. 1951).
42 Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 Mich. L.
Rev. 205, 222 (1942).
43 Akins v. McKnight, 13 F.R.D. 9 (N.D.Ohio 1952) (assessment of $3500 against the guilty party).
44 E.g., Chicago, R.I. & Pac.R.R. v. Williams, 245 F.2d 397, 403 (8th Cir. 1957).
45 Arkansas Tenn. Distributing Corp. v. Breidt, 209 F.2d 359 (3rd Cir. 1954); McGee v. Heim, 362
P.2d 193 (Colo. 1962), allowed a party to offer evidence contradicting an admission which resulted
from his failure to answer a request for admisison under Rule 36.
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been given in unusual cases. 46 It seems clear that admissions under
the rule must ordinarily have a binding effect, since otherwise the
purpose of the ruling in excluding issues from the trial would be
frustrated.
4 7
Because the plaintiff may anticipate that the defendant will
seek to introduce evidence in opposition to any crucial fact which
has been admitted, he must be prepared to produce testimony to
prove the admitted fact. However, with admissions in hand, he is
able to force the defendant at the pre-trial conference to limit the
issues in accordance with the Rule 36 admissions and can thereby
avoid the expense of proof at the time of trial.
46 United States v. Wimbley, 125 F.Supp. 691 (W.D. Ark. 1954); Barron & Holtzoff, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 838 (1961).
47 United States v. Lemons, 125 F.Supp. 686, 689 (W.D. Ark. 1954); International Carbonic
Engineering Co. v. Natural Carbonic Products, Inc., 57 F.Supp. 248 (S.D. Cal. 1944), aff'd 158
F.2d 285 (9th Cir. 1946).
reach for the CALLdirector
...a new telephone product for business
The Call Director is designed for the businessman who needs
more than six pushbuttons on his phone or the secretary who
answers for a number of people. With the Call Director, you can
hold calls, intercommunicate, and set up interoffice conference
calls. For complete information on this time-saving new product,
call the Telephone Business Office.
MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE
VOL. XL
1963 DISCOVERY, PRE-TRIAL AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT 205
VIII. REFUSAL TO MAKE DISCOVERY - CONSEQUENCES - RULE 37
Rule 37 appears at the end of the discovery section of the rules
and deals exclusively with sanctions to enforce compliance with
discovery which are broad enough to cover every contingency. 4
If a party, after receiving notice of the taking of his deposition
or after being served with interrogatories, willfully fails to appear
or to serve answers, the court may, under Rule 37(d), strike his
pleadings, dismiss the action, or enter a default judgment. The sev-
erity of these sanctions is essential under the liberal pleading rules
and especially since the "willful" requirement necessitates a deter-
mination that the default was not excusable.
49
On the other hand, if a party or any witness appears for deposi-
tion or serves answers to interrogatories but refuses to answer some
of the questions put to him, the rules are much less stringent, and
the court may, if an order is sought to compel answers, order the
recalcitrant party to pay reasonable expenses and attorney's fees.50
If the court enters an order compelling response to any discovery
request and the order is disobeyed, another group of sanctions be-
comes available. The court may, under Rule 37 (b), make such or-
ders "as are just," including the following enumerated sanctions:
1. Hold in contempt;
2. Take designated facts to be established in accordance
with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
3. Prohibit the disobedient party from supporting or oppos-
ing said claims or defenses or introducing certain evi-
dence;
4. Strike pleadings or parts thereof;
5. Stay proceedings until the order is obeyed;
6. Dismiss or enter a default judgment;
7. Arrest.
IX. SUMMARY JUDGMENT - RULE 56
Rule 56 (c) fixes the standard which the plaintiff must satisfy
if he is to obtain a summary judgment. It provides that the "judg-
ment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, deposi-
tions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."51
The summary judgment procedure is historically a plaintiff's reme-
dy, and Rule 56 was designed to prevent delay and afford judgment
where no defense existed and where the defense asserted to the
plaintiff's claim was merely a sham.52 The motion depends upon the
facts pleaded and the proof available to sustain the claim, and a
summary judgment may be granted when the movant would not
be entitled to a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 13 (c) or a
dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted," under Rule 12 (b) (6). The summary judgment rule was
48 Societe Int'l v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
49 Christenson, The Pre-Trial Order, 29 F.R.D. 362, 376 (1962); Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate
Pre-Trial Discovery, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 480 (1958).
50 Unilectric, Inc. v. Holwin Corp., 243 F.2d 393 (7th Cir. 1956).
51 Porter v. Jones, 176 F.2d 87 (10th Cir. 1949).
52 3-A Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1231 (1961); Clark and Samenow,
The Summary Judgement, 38 Yale L.J. 423 (1929).
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designed to enable the parties to utilize the discovery procedures
to ascertain facts and formulate issues which could be properly
disposed of as a matter of law by summary judgment without trial
on the merits.
53
A motion for summary judgment may or may not be accom-
panied by affidavits. If affidavits are offered in support of the judg-
ment, they must comply with the requirements of Rule 56 (e) and
must be based on personal knowledge rather than information and
belief. Sworn or certified copies of all papers, or parts thereof, re-
ferred to in an affidavit must be attached to the affidavit and served
with the affidavit.54 Moreover, the plaintiff must recognize that the
affidavits are measured by the rules of evidence, and not the rules
of discovery. 55 Rule 56 does not contemplate "trial by affidavit." If
the affidavits are in proper form, and there are before the court
affidavits which controvert each other as to material facts, then
the case is obviously not one for summary judgment, and a trial
will be ordered.
5 6
In addition to the affidavits, the court will take into considera-
tion the admissions which appear of record, either from pleadings
or from requests made pursuant to Rule 36, together with the de-
positions and interrogatories which are on file with the court.57
Once discovery is completed and the pleadings have been analyzed,
the sham defense stands out where it can be readily challenged.
The cloak of a formal allegation denying liability will not be found
to demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue as to a material
fact, and summary judgment will enter if the resisting party elects
to rest on his pleadings.,5
Rule 56(d) also causes the court to ascertain, in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment, the facts which are not in substan-
tial controversy, and thereby grants the plaintiff an opportunity
to limit the issues for pre-trial or trial. Thus, Rule 56, when coupled
with the discovery rules, grants the plaintiff an opportunity for
early judgment in a proper case.
X. PRE-TRIAL - RULE 16
The pre-trial hearing is the "warp and woof" of discovery. 59
... It permits the total discovery picture to be discussed
at one time. It facilitates the issuance of a broad order reg-
ulating the future course of discovery, as well as settling
specific discovery problems which are pending ....
Pre-trial must be tailored to the individual case. Some
cases will demand a very complete initial pre-trial confer-
ence and a series of subsequent conferences to deal with
other emerging difficulties. Some cases will be sufficiently
controlled by a complete initial pre-trial order that, ar-
ranges with particularity the details of future discovery. No
generalizations as to the form of pre-trial procedures should
53 Weller, Summary Judgement, 12 Wyo. L.J. 247 (1957-58).
54 Walling v. Fairmount Creamery, 139 F.2d 318 (8th Cir. 1943).
55 Jomeson v. Jameson, 176 F.2d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
56 Lemley, Summary Judgment Procedure Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
Its Use and Abuse, 11 Ark. L. Rev. 138 (1957).
57 Pike & Willis, New Federal Deposition - Discovery Procedure, 38 Colum. L. Rev. 1436 (1938).58 Engl v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 139 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1943); United States v. Dollar, 100 F.Supp.
881 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Hays, The Use of Summary Judgment, 28 F.R.D. 126 (1960).
59 Kaufman, Judicial Control of Discovery, 28 F.R.D. 111, 124 (1961).
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be made lest formalism and rigidity develop to rob the pre-
trial conference of its greatest asset - flexibility.
The federal rules are designed to find the truth and to
prepare for the disposition of the case in favor of the party
who is justly deserving of a judgment. To limit discovery
arbitrarily because of some preconceived notion as to time
or scope is merely to transfer uncertainties and ambiguities
to the trial itself. The trial process is not designed to deal
adequately with a mass of undigested and undifferentiated
data. There is nothing more dispiriting than a trial wherein
the attorneys are not only not clear as to the opponents'
positions, but are really quite confused as to their own
cases. Documents are offered, witnesses testify, details pile
up, and, from a welter of confusion, justice is supposed
somehow to ensue. A little time and effort spent before trial
can often eliminate a shocking waste of far more expensive
trial time. This is to the advantage of both sides, and im-
proves the administration of justice. 0
Besides controlling discovery, the pre-trial conference often
functions as a discovery device itself, facilitating and even sup-
planting the operation of particular disclosure procedures. For ex-
ample, stipulations reached at the conference and embodied in the
pre-trial order may have essentially the same effect as Rule 36 ad-
missions in excluding issues from consideration at the trial. The
pursuit of such stipulations has been formalized in some courts by
requiring the parties to prepare for use at the conference written
statements of their positions in the case. By comparing the opposing
statements, the judge can see which factual questions are not truly
relevant or disputed and often can induce the parties to stipulate
them out of the case. While admissions sought in these circum-
stances do not carry the cost-of-proof sanction of Rule 37 (c), the
presence of opposing counsel and the judge may often prove a more
effective stimulant. The use of such stipulations at the pre-trial may
help to explain the relative neglect of Rule 36.
Another discovery procedure sometimes supplanted by the pre-
trial conference is the production of documents under Rule 34 or 45.
Many federal courts require that each party produce at the confer-
ence for inspection by his adversary all the documents, except those
to be used for impeachment, which he intends to introduce at the
trial. The penalty for noncompliance is exclusion of the withheld
document from evidence, except when its existence or relevance
does not become known until after the conference. This procedure
for production of the documents a party intends to introduce does
not completely replace Rule 34, since it is often the documents a liti-
gant wants to conceal which most interest his opponent. However,
for at least some of the necessary documents it obviates the incon-
venience of Rule 34's requirement of a formal motion, a showing
of good cause, and reasonable specificity of designation.
The conference may also be effective in complementing pre-
viously instituted discovery processes. When Rule 33 interrogatories
60 See also, Seminar on Procedure for Effective Judicial Administration, 29 F.R.D. 201-314 (1962);
Seminar on Practice and Procedure uncer the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 F.R.D. 37-301
(1961); Handbook of Recommended Procedures for the Trial of Protracted Cases, 25 F.R.D. 351 (1960).
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have already been served and answered or documents produced for
inspection, counsel may be prepared at the conference to stipulate
the truth of his opponent's answers or the authenticity of the docu-
ments he has produced. Further, the problem of a party's "con-
tinuing duty" to assure on his own initiative the truthfulness and
completeness of Rule 33 answers can be obviated, at least up to the
date of the conference, by requiring at that time disclosure of rele-
vant information acquired after the original answers were served.6 1
The run-of-the-mill case should be presented to the pre-trial
judge shortly before trial with a workable pre-trial statement pre-
pared for the court, so that each of the items specified in Rule 16
can be fully and fairly placed before the court for resolution. The
technique and the procedures for conducting the conference varies
from court to court, but the rule itself dictates a procedure.6 2 Wise
use of discovery makes the pre-trial conference come into its proper
place and shortens the time, expense and complexity of every trial.
XI. CONCLUSION
The plaintiff's advantageous use of discovery will necessarily
lead to a fair evaluation of his case. With the proper discovery, sum-
mary judgment becomes an obtainable end to all or some of the
issues, and pre-trial is expedited. In short, the notice pleading con-
templated by the Federal Rules, when coupled with proper dis-
covery, assures a simplified trial and speedier justice.
61 Note, The Continuing Nature of Discovery Techniques, 42 Iowa L. Rev. 579 (1957).
62 See, Kincaid, A Judge's Handbook of Pre-Trial Procedure, 17 F.R.D. 437 (1955); Rule 16, when
analyzed as a whole, seems to serve four general purposes:
1. To identify, designate, and clarify the true issues and eliminate apparent issues which present
no real controversy.
2. To facilitate proof, by means of stipulations regarding:
(a) Admissions of fact and genuineness of documents,
(b) Waiver of formal proof of documents and things,
(c) Physical or mental examination of the person,
(d) Inspection of books or property,
(e) Interrogotories and depositions,
(f) Limitation upon the number of witnesses,
(g) References to a master to make findings, and
(h) Other similar matters.
3. To offer a convenient opportunity for disposing of preliminary matters, such as dismissal,
change of venue to another division, judgment, consolidation of cases and separation of issues for
trial, fixing the date of trial, etc.
4. To encourage settlements.
Sunderland, Procedure for Pre-Trial Conferences in the Federal Courts, 28 J.Am.Jud.Soc'y. 46, 47
(1944). See also, Steyer, Discovery in Pre-Trial Conference Procedure, 23 F.R.D. 347 (1959).
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A LEGAL DILEMMA -
INJURY CAUSED BY PSYCHIC STIMULI
By SAM W. LOSLI*
This paper was awarded the 1963 Omar E. Garwood Memorial
Prize of $100 in a competition sponsored by the Association of
Colorado Claimants' Attorneys.
I. INTRODUCTION
• . . Our philosophy will tell us the proper function of
law in telling us the ends that law should endeavor to at-
tain; but closely related to such a study is the inquiry
whether law, as it has developed in this subject or in that,
does in truth fulfill its function-is functioning well or
ill .... 1
Laymen criticize the common law system as antiquated, obso-
lete, stagnate, and even unjust. In these days of ever changing
methods and ideas, phenomenally rapid increase in knowledge in
fields of science and medicine, society often grows impatient with
the slow moving common law and seeks more rapid changes in
legislatures of our country. Modern society is critical of anything
with its roots in the middle ages.2
Those who deal with the common law in their professions d6-
fend the system's slow change as being more certain, resting on
precedent after precedent like building a very strong and trust-
worthy castle. No attempt will be made here to defend or criticize
the common law system. Consideration will be limited to one small,
slow-moving area of our present day law that has been open to just
criticism by laymen and lawyer alike, viz., injury caused by psychic
stimuli.
Failure to move, to keep up with advances in science and medi-
cine, and even society itself, is not the sole basis for criticism in this
field of law, however. Another is the ugly stones of precedent used
in making a very unattractive castle.
Some courts were early in recognizing the mistaken premises
on which the earliest decisions refused damages for injury caused
by psychic stimuli, and others followed their lead, defending them-
selves by pointing out the broad statements and illogical conclu-
sions which make bad law. Finally, in 1961, the strongest of all
precedent against awarding damages for injury caused by fright was
replaced. New York's Mitchell v. Rochester Ry. 3 fell and in its place
Batalla v. State4 stands as a monument of the changing thought in
this confused field of law.5
New York is not the only state that has changed views on this
subject. The Mitchell case has been singled out only because of its
strong position for so many years, and because lawyers and pro-
fessors of law throughout the United States have used it as the
* June graduate, University of Denver College of Law.
1 Cardozo, The Growth of the Law 112 (1924).
2 Pound, The Future of American Law, in Legal Methods and System, 97 (1950).
3 151 N.Y. 107, 45 N.E. 354 (1896).
4 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961).
5 McCormick, Damages, 319-320 (1935).
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leading case for the rule of no award for injury caused by fright,
unaccompanied by bodily contact. By the time the Mitchell case was
overruled, however, it had become a light for a dwindling minority."
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The more we study law in its making, at least in its
present stages of development, the more we gain the sense
of a gradual striving toward an end, shaped by a logic
which, eschewing the quest for certainty, must be satisfied
if its conclusions are rooted in the probable. 7
Before 1880, the American courts had had few if any cases
before them presenting the question of injury by fright. This action,
historically, is based on allowance of redress for assault as a form
of trespass in early English law. "A, with the apparent means and
intention to commit a battery indulges willful conduct toward B or
a third person arousing in him a reasonable apprehension that the
threatened harmful or offensive touching will be carried forthwith
into impact. A is liable to B in damages for his assault."'
It is said that this earliest protection dedicated to mental tran-
quility seemingly "was to prevent assaults and consequently
breaches of the peace and did not represent judicial solicitude for
the psychic."9
As we review the development of this cause of action in Eng-
land and the United States, it should be noted that injury caused by
psychic stimuli or fear is so closely related to mental anguish situ-
ations that courts often confuse and relate the two. It does not seem
to be a great error, for injury caused by psychic stimuli is but one
step beyond mental distress-the injury being the product of severe
mental distress. However, fright may at times cause a direct physi-
cal injury because of a faint or panic, but these actions are in turn
related to severe mental distress. 10
The first case of record involving mental anguish related-to this
subject arose through an action for mental anguish and other dam-
ages, caused when the defendant seduced the plaintiff's daughter.
The court granted plaintiff's right to sue for these damages." In
Irwin v. Dearman, mentioned in Flemington v. Smithers,1 the court
limited damages for parents' mental distress caused by injury to
their child to situations where such damages arose from seduction
of their children. This is still the general rule, although courts are
beginning to realize that damages for injury caused to parents be-
cause of fear for their children should be given in some situations. 13
The next important case arose through a complaint of slander.
This is the celebrated case of Alsop v. Alsop.14 The plaintiff claimed
6 Burke, J. in Botalla v. State, supra note 4, said ". it is well to note that it [The
Mitchell case doctrine] hos been thoroughly repudiated by the English Courts which initiated it,
rejected by a majority of American jurisdictions, abandoned by many which originally adopted it,
and diluted, through numerous exceptions, in the minority which retained it." See also, 13 Syracuse
L. Rev. 176 (1961).
7 Supra note 1 at 70.
8 Smith, Relations of Emotions to Injury and Disease: Legal Liability for Psychic Stimuli, 30
Va. L. Rev. 193 (194).
9 Ibid.
10 See 64 A.L.R.2d 103, 104 (1959).
11 Chambers v. Irwin, 2 Selw, N.P. 1100 (1800).
12 2 Car. & P. 292, 172 Eng. Rep. 131 (K.B. 1826).
13 "The law appears to be moving in the direction of liability but thus far it clearly is limited
to the most extreme cases of violent attack, where there is an especial likelihood of fright or
shock, usually on the part of a woman." Prosser, Torts, 47 (2d ed. 1955).
14 5 H & N 534, 175 Eng. Rep. 1292 (Ex. 1860).
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that the defendant had falsely charged her with inconstancy and
when these reports, made to third persons, came to her attention,
she suffered nervous shock and mental illness severe enough to
require medical care. The Exchequer ruled there was no cause of
action because there was no legal precedent for such damages. If
the court would recognize sickness for special damage, this would
broaden liability for slander and make free speech more perilous,
lay a foundation for a new and novel claim, and besides, said the
court, illness for slander is not a natural consequence of defamation
and thus too remote.
15
In 1888, the case of Victorian R. Comm'r v. Coultas16 reached
the Privy Council, and was decided on the narrow point of injury
caused by fright produced by defendant's negligence. The case arose
in Canada, and the facts as stated are of some import. Coultas and
his sister, driving a horse and buggy, approached defendant's tracks.
The gatekeeper, an employee of defendant, allowed them to cross
over but a train was rapidly approaching. Upon seeing the train the
gatekeeper shouted for them to go back but Coultas directed the
gatekeeper to open the gate on the other side, which he did, and
Coultas got the buggy across the tracks just as the train went by,
narrowly missing the Coultas buggy. The sister suffered such fright
she became ill and sued the defendant for injuries occasioned by
this fright.
The Council, after considering the impossibility of such injury
caused by nervous shock arising from and as a consequence of the
gatekeeper's negligence and after finding no precedent for the
action stated that the difficulty which so often exists in cases of
alleged physical injuries of determining whether they were caused
by the negligent act, would be greatly increased, and a wide field
open for imaginary claims.1 7 Thus, this leading case was decided
mainly on the point of public policy.
It was upon the Coultas decision that New York based its own
conclusions in deciding Mitchell v. Rochester Ry., supra. In this
leading American case, the defendant's employee drove a streetcar
so negligently, that the horses drawing the car almost ran down
the plaintiff, finally stopping on either side of her, and frightening
her so badly she subsequently had a miscarriage. Plaintiff sued for
damages based on her injury caused by fright alone. The court held
15 Supra, note 8 at 195.
16 13 App. Cas. 222, 57 L. J. P. C. 69 (P.C. 1888).
17 Supra, note 8 at 197.
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that public policy, the "flood of litigation" theory, precluded an
action based solely on fright. The fear of feigned injury appears to
have been the final determining factor.
1 8
English law veered quickly away from the Coultas case rule,
but it was too late in the United States. The corner stone had been
placed and the building was being built upon it as quickly as fact
situations allowed. 9 However, in 1890, the highest court of Texas
listened to argument concerning another miscarriage. The case of
Hill v. Kimball20 was decided against the defendant, and the court
expressly rejected the Mitchell doctrine, initiating the rule that has
become the majority rule today.2 1 The plaintiff alleged that the de-
fendant, who knew of her advanced pregnancy and delicate health,
came into her yard and violently assaulted two Negroes, using pro-
fane language and drawing blood. As a result of his actions, plaintiff
became frightened and suffered a miscarriage.
The court said that although there was no legal precedent, it
was not a sufficient reason for denying recovery, and that there
could be no doubt that a physical injury might be produced through
a strong emotion of the mind; the fact that it was more difficult to
produce such an injury through mental operations than by direct
physical means afforded no sufficient ground for refusing compen-
sation where the injury was intentionally inflicted.
18 Supro, note 3.
19 Courts originally or still following the New York Rule: U.S. (There is some question) Chicago,
B. & Q. R. R. v. Gelvin, 238 Fed. 14 (8th Cir. 1916); But see Kaufman v. Western Union Tel., 224
F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 947.
Ark. St. Louis I.M. & S. R. R. v. Bragg, 69 Ark. 402, 64 S.W. 226, 86 Am. St. Rep. 206 (1901);
Ill. Braun v. Craven, 175 III. 401, 51 N.E. 657 (1898);
nd. Boston v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 223 Ind. 425, 61 N.E.2d 326 (1945);
Ken. Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272 (1929);
Me. Herrick v. Evening Exp. Pub. Co., 120 Me. 138, 113 Ati. 16;
Moss. Spade v. Lynn & B.R.R., 168 Mass. 285. 47 N.E. 88 (1897);
Mich. Nelson v. Crawford, 122 Mich. 466, 81 N.W. 335 (1899); Alexander v. Pacholek, 222 Mich.
157, 192 N.W. 652 (1923);
Mo. Trigg v. St. Louis, K.C. & N.R.R., 74 Mo. 147 (1881);
N.J. Ward v. West Jersey & S.R.R., 65 N.J.L. 383, 47 Ati. 561 (1900); Greenberg v. Stanley, 51
N.J. Super. 90, 143 A.2d 588 (1958);
Ohio Miller v. Baltimore & O.S.W.R.R., 78 Ohio 309, 85 N.E. 499 (1908);
Penn. Potere v. Philadelphia, 380 Pa. 581, 112 A.2d 100 (1955);
Va. Bowles v. May, 159 Va. 419, 166 S.E. 550 (1932);
Wash. Stiles v. Pantages Theatre Co., 152 Wash. 626, 276 Pac. 112 (1929);
NOTE: Some of the above states do not follow the same rule in cases of willful wrong. See 64
A.L.R.2d 134.
20 76 Tex. Civ. App. 210, 13 S.W. 59 (1890).
21 Cases following Majority Rule are:
U.S. See footnote 19, supra;
Ala. Alabama F. & I. Co. v. Baladoni, 15 Ala. App. 316, 73 So. 205 (1916);
Calif. State Rubbish Collectors Ass'n v. Siliznoff, 38 Cal. 2d 330, 240 P.2d 282 (1952);
Conn. Urban v. Hartford Gas Co., 139 Conn. 301, 93 A.2d 292 (1952);
Go. Kuhr Bros., Inc. v. Spahos, 89 Ga. App. 885, 81 S.E.2d 491 (1954);
Kan. Whitsel v. Watts, 98 Kan. 508, 159Pac. 401 (1916);
La. Stewart v. Arkansas So. R.R., 112 La. 764, 36 So. 676 (1904);
Md. Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A.2d 923 (1951);
Minn. Purcell v. St. Paul City R.R., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892);
Mont. Kelly v. Lowrey & Williams, Inc, 113 Mont. 385, 126 P.2d 486 (1942);
Neb. Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674, aff'd on rehearing 135 Neb. 232,
280 N.W. 890, (1938);
New Homp. Cote v. Litawa, 96 N.H. 174, 71 A.2d 792 (1950);
N.Y. Battala v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729 (1961);
N. Car. Kirby v. Jules Chain Stores Corp., 210 N.C. 808, 188 S.E. 625 (1936);
Ohio Lewis v. Woodland, 101 Ohio App. 442, 140 N.E.2d 322 (1955) (overrules footnote 19, supra);
Oklahoma Belt v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 195 F.2d 241 (10th Cir. 1952);
Ore. Salmi v. Columbia & N. Riv. R.R., 75 Ore. 200, 146 Pac. 819 (1915);
R.I. Simone v. Rhode Island Co., 28 R.I. 186, 66 Ati. 202 (1907);
S. C. Padgett v. Colonial Wholesale Distrib. Co., 232 S.C. 593, 103 S.E.2d 265 (1958);
Tenn. Memphis St. R. v. Bernstein, 137 Tenn. 637, 194 S.W. 902 (1917);
Tex. Hill v. Kimball, note 20, supra; Duty v. General Finance Co., 154 Tex. 16, 273 S.W.2d 64
(1954);
Va. See note 15, supra;
Wash. See note 9, Supra, c.f. O'Meara v. Russell, 90 Wash. 557, 156 Pac. 550 (1916); Frazee
v. Westrn Dairy Prod., 182 Wash. 578, 47 P.2d 1037 (1935);
Wis. Pankopf v. Hinkley, 141 Wis. 146, 123 N.W. 625 (1909); Colic v. Mandella, 1 Wis. 2d
594, 85 N.W.2d 345 (1957).
INJURY BY PSYCHIC STIMULI
III. MODERN APPROACHES
Recalling that the action for mental distress is closely related
to that for injury caused by fear, it is noteworthy that the American
courts have allowed damages in almost all situations where there
is injury or a contemporary tort upon which to attach the damages
for mental distress.
Generally, the rule today allows no recovery for mental distress
alone resulting from mere negligence. The courts, including those
following the minority rule in relation to injury caused by fear,
have made exceptions in certain fact situations allowing mental
distress damages to be a parasitic element, such as in a trespass on
plaintiff's person or property, a negligent physical injury, injury to
reputation, freedom of movement or right of privacy.
When there is contemporaneous injury, the courts do not sepa-
rate the injury from the mental distress. In other actions, mental
distress is an exception to the rule and independent of the action-
able tort, such as simple assault, invasion of property or breach of
contract; a special duty placed on public carriers requires even less
than simple assault to bring forth damages for mental distress.
22
The history of injury from psychic stimuli discussed in Section
II shows that the development of the action has not been strong or
certain. England adopted and then rejected the doctrine that no
award may be given. American courts rejected the rule in the ma-
jority of cases for allowing damages, but then shifted, and in doing
so, created the exceptions discussed above. Today, so many excep-
tions to the rule that mental distress is not actionable have been
created that it would seem that awarding mental distress damages
is the general rule, and the few situations where it is rejected, viz.,
where there is mental distress alone, caused by mere negligence of
the defendant, is the exception.
With the trend towards liberality in this field, the question
arises-what will Colorado do when the case comes before the
highest court? In analyzing the cases up to 1961, it might be con-
cluded that Colorado would follow the more conservative Mitchell
case, but since Mitchell has been overruled by the New York court,
and because of recent liberalization in its own thought, a more mod-
ern decision will probably be forthcoming.
Battalla v. State reflects the modern thought on this broad
field.2 3 The facts stated in that case were that infant plaintiff was so
frightened that she became hysterical when defendant's employee
failed to fasten and lock the belt on the chair lift in which plaintiff
had been placed. As a consequence of her fear, plaintiff suffered
injuries.
In the opinion by Judge Burke, all the arguments against
awarding damages were said to be of no effect any longer except
that of public policy. He discusses the case by eliminating the public
policy argument. Judge Burke first says: "Although fraud, extra
22 64 A.L.R.2d 103, 106.
23 New York has always been the leading state for not awarding damages, but they too have
decided to reject the rule of the Mitchell case. "It is undisputed that a rigorous application of its
rule would be unjust, as well as opposed to experience and logic. On the other hand, resort to
the somewhat inconsistent exceptions would mere y add further confusion to o legal situation
which presently lacks that coherence which precedent should possess." Battallo v. State, Supra note
4 at 730.
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litigation and a measure of speculation are, of course, possibilities,
it is no reason for a court to eschew a measure of its jurisdiction."
Quoting from Green v. T. A. Shoemaker & Co.,24 the court says:
"The argument from mere expediency cannot commend
itself to a Court of justice, resulting in the denial of a logi-
cal legal right and remedy in all cases because in some a
fictitious injury may be urged as a real one." . . . It seems
that fraudulent accidents and injuries are just as easily
feigned in the slight-impact cases and other exceptions
wherein New York permits a recovery, as in the no-impact
cases which it has heretofore shunned....
The Mitchell case encourages claimants to perjure themselves,
and in itself causes excess litigation .. . Speculation of proof in
individual situations should not be the arbitrary bases upon which
to bar all actions.
In Colorado, we have as many exceptions to the rule of denying
damages for mental distress as most jurisdictions, and more than
some. Here, too, it has become the exception to deny damages for
mental distress.25 This is not a situation to be deplored, but one
which is typical of the times. It is known that mental distress of a
severe nature causes injury. It may take the form of injury caused
by slight trauma which in turn operates upon a psychoneurotic con-
dition, or it may take the form of injury from purely psychic
stimuli.
Where there has been impact of substantial nature, the Colo-
rado courts have always awarded damages for mental distress as an
element of damages. The cases are too numerous and the law so well
entrenched that citations are here omitted.
The courts have extended the rule to actions where there is but
slight impact but serious injury, the typical psychoneurotic case.
This is the area of tort law in which Judge Burke declares injuries
are questionable and as easily feigned as in the situation where
there is no impact.
Such a possibility existed in City of Denver v. Hyatt.26 The
plaintiff fell when she stepped into a hole in the boardwalk of a
city street. The immediate result of the fall was a sprained ankle
and a bruised back. Shortly afterwards she began suffering from
what doctors claimed was a diseased abdominal organ. Several phy-
sicians testified, two were appointed by the court. One physician
said that her internal condition was caused by the fall, another
testified that her condition could be traced to other reasons. The
first court-appointed physician said that such internal condition, as
far as he knew, could never be traced to such a fall. The court al-
lowed her damages, but added, that if the jury believed that her
injury was the result of a latent disease activated from the fall, she
might recover for the amount of aggravation. Finally, the court said,
The sidewalks of the city are for the use of those with
organic predisposition to disease as well as for the healthy
and robust, and any injury which the former may sustain
by reason of defects in such sidewalks, which result in ag-
24 111 Md. 69, 81, 73 Ati. 688, 692.
25 Judge Burke states that even the minority which has retained the rule of the Mitchell case
has diluted it with exceptions. Batalla v. State, supra note 4 at 730.
2628 Colo. 129, 63 Pac. 403 (1900).
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gravating an already diseased condition, are results for
which the city must respond if otherwise liable.
2 7
In Colorado Springs & Interurban Ry. v. Marr'2 1 the court
allowed testimony to the effect that plaintiff was unable to do her
household duties or make large dinners, was losing her hair, getting
gray hair, melancholy, etc., but, stated that these were admissible
only to show physical condition after the accident and not for com-
pensation. However, the court also stated that if these damages
were specially pleaded, there might be compensation forthcoming.
29
In Colorado Springs and Interurban Ry. v. Nichols, 30 the court
allowed damages for plaintiff's neurasthenia allegedly caused by
being thrown from the seat of defendant's interurban railway car.
In this case, however, plaintiff did prove her miscarriage was a
result of the negligence and if neurasthenia developed as a result of
that unquestionably unhappy event, the chain of causation would
stem from defendant's negligence.
In the next case, the question was not whether there were dam-
ages, but whether it was error for the trial court to refuse defend-
ant's motion to subject plaintiff to a physical examination to de-
termine if the damages were permanent. In Western Glass Mfg. Co.
v. Schoeninger 3 1 the court held it to be error. Evidence indicated
that plaintiff's immediate injury was negligible. There was no visi-
ble injury nor at the time did the alleged injury inconvenience the
plaintiff. Two or more weeks after the injury the plaintiff consulted
a physician and upon statements of plaintiff and plaintiff's mother,
the physician diagnosed and treated the injury as Saint Vitus dance
with partial paralysis. After a month plaintiff returned to work as
before. A year later the physician examined plaintiff in order to
prepare himself to testify at the trial. It was claimed that plaintiff
would have recurring attacks of paralysis for life. These facts seem
to indicate a psychoneurotic condition which at most was aggra-
vated by the injury, yet the court did not consider this point in its
decision.
Perhaps the most obviously psychoneurotic situation is seen in
Colorado Springs & Interurban Ry. v. Allen.3 2 As plaintiff was
alighting from an electric streetcar, she claims the car gave a jerk
which in turn subjected her to injury to her spinal column, nervous
system, circulation and general health. According to the testimony,
plaintiff's exclamations of pain did not begin for several months
after the accident. The trial court instructed the jury as to damages
saying:
In arriving at the amount of your verdict, you may
take into consideration the nature and character of the
injuries, the mental, physical pain if any, she has suffered
or will suffer as the proximate result of such injuries.
33
Again there was no discussion of the possible aggravation of an
27 Id. at 139, 63 Pac. at 406.
28 26 Colo. App. 48, 141 Poc. 142 (1914).
29 Injuries were incurred when plaintiff was knocked to the ground while alighting from the
electric car.
30 41 Colo. 272, 92 Pac. 691 (1907).
31 42 Colo. 357, 94 Pac. 342 (1908).
3248 Colo. 4, 108 Pac. 990 (1910).
33 Id. at 11, 108 Pac. at 993.
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already existing neurotic condition; there was merely an acceptance
of the claims as plaintiff made them.
Finally, in Parker v. City & County of Denver, 4 where plain-
tiff was injured on a faulty sidewalk, suffering minor injuries at
the time but severe later effects, the court held she had a valid
claim for damages. But when plaintiff fell through the trap door in
defendant's kitchen and brought an action for damages suffered as
a result of appendicitis, the court drew the line, saying the claim
was too remote.
35
In reciting these cases to the reader, it is not to be implied that
the plaintiffs should not receive compensation for their injuries and
the mental distress suffered at the time and as a result of the in-
juries. It is meant to point out that such slight traumatic stimuli
causing severe injury results in a claim for substantial damages in
all of the above cases. Colorado has long given such damages to
plaintiff, but for many years indicated that it would not allow
plaintiff substantial damages for mere psychic stimuli resulting in
injury.
36
In the case of a slight traumatic injury, the sarcasm that the
true measure of defendant's damages is hindsight rather than fore-
sight is a fact. The test of foreseeability is completely neglected in
most cases, and once the defendant's action has been connected to
the injury suffered by plaintiff, the door is thrown open to any re-
34 128 Colo. 355, 262 P.2d 553 (1953).
35 Burnside v. Peterson, 43 Colo. 382, 96 Pac. 256 (1908).
36 Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 1511 (1913).
(ffEA _DWYCOODS CO.
WHERE DENVER SHOPS WITH CONFIDENCE
* Qytone 4.2111 e ,vq e. - DEte, 3.8555 Cmadf • GEnesee 3.6611
FEEL CONFIDENT IN
KUPPENHEIMER
Confident about comfort . . . confident
you're in style . . . confident you look your
best. Yes, there's nothing like a Kuppen-
heimer for building a man's confidence in
himself. Come in soon . . . let us show you
these confidence builders . . . they'll help
you open every door you want open.
110.00 and 125.00
Men's Shop, All 3 "Denvers"
INJURY BY PSYCHIC STIMULI
sulting claim within reason. Thus a five dollar touch becomes a five
thousand dollar claim.
3 7
Hubert Winston Smith and Harry C. Solomon, in their article
Traumatic Neuroses in Court, have divided injury actions into three
groups, perhaps over-simplifying the situation."
1. Those cases where there is slight stimuli, causing great harm.
This group is made up of those suffering from a pre-existing neu-
rotic condition, upon which the slight stimulus operates, causing
more harm than would have been caused in the average constituted
person.
2. Those cases where there has been a great stimulus, either
trauma, or psychosyncratic, and has resulted in injury. These cases
are made up of the average constituted person who would have been
injured by such stimulus.
3. Those borderline cases which do not clearly fall in either
class. This is the clincher, for these cases are those that cause courts
most trouble, and, because of the difficulty in proof, have resulted
in the Mitchell rule when psychic stimuli alone is involved.
39
Although the authors state that these groups can be easily
divided, it is impossible to separate them clearly for each group
must blend into the other like different shades of whites, grays and
blacks.
In the same article, the authors state:
It may also be accepted as true that all individuals have
some tendency or capacity to worry, to be fearful, to be
concerned, and that all have some psychoneurotic mani-
festations. This is much like saying that no one is free of
some fear or bodily pathology, but not thereby ill.
40
Thus, if it is true that all persons have some tendency to psy-
choneurotic manifestations, we can see that the degree and com-
plexities of the stimuli working upon the individual, the amount of
predisposition towards a psychoneurotic condition, and the severity
of the stimuli, whether traumatic or psychic, all contribute to the
amount of resulting injury. This cause and effect phenomena can
more easily be understood by a quotation from Law and Medicine.
All neurotic phenomena are based on insufficiencies of
the normal control apparatus. They can be understood as
involuntary emergency discharges that supplant the normal
ones. The insufficiency can be brought about in two ways.
One way is through an increase in the influx of stimuli;
too much excitation enters the mental apparatus in a given
unit of time and cannot be mastered; such experiences are
called traumatic ....
However, the expression 'too high' is a relative one; it
means beyond the capacity of mastery. This capacity de-
pends on constitutional factors as well, as on all of the indi-
vidual's previous experiences. There are stimuli of such
overwhelming intensity that they have a traumatic effect
on anyone .... 41
37 Prosser, Torts 179 (2d ed. 1955).
38 Smith and Solomon, Traumatic Neuroses in Court, 30 Va. L. Rev. 87 (1943).
39 Id. at 107-109.
40 Ibid.
41 Curran, Low and Medicine 290 (1960).
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The cause-effect described above is just the beginning of the
eventual injury caused by the slight trauma or by the psychic
stimuli. There develops a small difference in causation between the
psychic stimuli resulting in injury and the minor traumatic experi-
ence which results in serious injury, after the phenomena described
above. Smith calls the phenomena a focal experience. The devel-
opment of the neurosis which is the visible injury seen by the court
and jury may develop in a matter of minutes, hours, weeks, or
even months.
From this very limited discussion it is possible to determine
that psychic stimuli and minor traumatic impact resulting in severe
incapacity have similar causes. However, it should be noted that
there are situations where there is no causal connection between
stimulus and neurosis because the injury was very severe or the
psychic stimulus extremely harrowing. The usual case operates in
the same way as the minor impact case. The stimuli, either psychic
or traumatic, operates on a neurotic condition and causes serious
injury or even disease. The legal difference is that in the jurisdic-
tions where the minority rule expounded in the Mitchell case is fol-
lowed, the minor impact results in an award for the plaintiff, while
the severe psychic stimuli gives none. As can be seen by the above
cases, Colorado has awarded damages for injuries resulting from
minor impact; it is difficult to see why it will not in the future
award damages for psychic stimuli.
The general rule for awarding damages for mental anguish
when the plaintiff has suffered a contemporaneous injury allows
courts and juries to consider fright at the time of the injury, appre-
hension as to its effects, nervousness, or humiliation at disfigure-
ment. However, Colorado has placed some arbitrary lines in the
area of apprehension as to its effects and humiliation at disfigure-
ment. In this area, Colorado seems to be extremely conservative,
or at least so in the past.
In Diamond Rubber Co. v. Harryman,42 when the lower court
allowed damages for mental suffering arising from disfigurement of
the plaintiff, the supreme court held:
No rule for awarding damages for mental suffering, how-
ever caused can be formulated so as to define a certain basis
upon which such damages can be estimated. This is espe-
cially true with respect to mental suffering .resulting from
disfigurement. The cases in which damages should be al-
lowed, if recoverable at all, should be confined to the nar-
rowest possible limits, where it was evident that a claim
therefor was meritorious.
43
The door has been left slightly open. The major premise upon
which the court bases its decision for declining damages is under-
lined, and points out that it is the same rule for which damages
for fright causing injury was rejected in so many jurisdictions be-
fore the trend towards liberalization. It should be noted, however,
that where there is an element of maliciousness or willfulness, the
Colorado court follows the general rule.
In Gerick v. Brock,44 plaintiff brought action for damages re-
42 41 Colo. 415, 92 Pac. 922 (1907).
43 Id. at 420-21, 92 Pac. at 926.
44 120 Colo. 394, 210 P.2d 214 (1949).
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sulting from a personal assault by defendant. The defendant al-
legedly pushed the plaintiff from defendant's car when the injured
man attempted to prevent the defendant from using the car. The
plaintiff suffered numerous wounds about the head and body and
a double fracture of his right leg. These injuries resulted in further
suffering by the plaintiff, some of which must have been thought
imaginary by the jury because it awarded only a fraction of what
the plaintiff asked. The court allowed the plaintiff damages for
nervous shock, physical and mental pain and anguish endured as a
result of the injuries "together with such as will necessarily endure
in the future ...."
A further differentiation was specified by the court in Denver
City Tramway Co. v. Martin.45 Plaintiff was injured when defend-
ant's tramway car hit the surrey in which she was riding. The
court said:
In a case of this character we are inclined to the opin-
ion that the rule established by the cases cited is, that any
physical and mental suffering attending or arising from
the injury received may be regarded as a part of the injury,
and as such, a proper subject of compensation; but injured
feelings which might arise in the mind, resulting from the
injury, not being a part of the pain naturally attending the
injury, cannot be regarded as an element of damages.
4
The court lists as mental distress caused by injured feelings that
mental pain and suffering caused by mortification, humiliation as a
result of a maimed, disfigured or crippled body. Since this case was
decided one year after the Diamond Rubber case, it may be con-
cluded that it is further amplification of the previous rule. However,
it seems broad enough to exclude injury caused by psychic stimuli
if the court continues to follow it.
A case more closely related to the question presented in this
paper arose in Grant v. Gwynn.47 Plaintiff Gwynn brought action
for assault and battery, requesting damages for injury and exem-
plary damages. Defendant Grant denied and counterclaimed for
mental distress, alleging that disturbances created by Gwynn over
a period of time damaged her personal and business reputation
and caused her to suffer shock and mental distress. The court re-
jected this claim saying:
We consider first the question of whether the court
erred in dismissing the two claims incorporated in the coun-
terclaim of Grant. With reference to the first claim the
trial court stated, in denying the motion for new trial:
"..... there is no claim stated. There never was any breath
of life in that claim." In essence, it is a claim arising
from alleged emotional disturbance resulting from alleged
threats and "annoying" conduct attributed to Gwynn which
caused "mental distress" in the mind of Grant, over a
period of time (not specified) prior to the incident which
forms the basis for Gwynn's complaint. 48
45 44 Colo. 324, 98 Pac. 836 (1908).
46 Id. at 338, 98 Poc. at 841.
47 365 P.
2
d 256 (Colo. 1961).
48 Id. at 259.
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There, the mental distress was not caused by immediate fear of
injury, nor by one severe psychic stimulus, but by many acts over
a period of time. This would seem to cause a condition bordering
on worry, rather than fear; there is some difference in the conno-
tation of the words but both come under the general heading of
mental distress. Although the court would not accept the fact
that injury could result from mental distress over a period of
time, this is a much more common phenomena than injury through
fright, although both reactions are well known and documented at
this date. Curran states that the stress of life plays an immense
role in the development of neurotic illness, 49 and Smith, in his
much mentioned article, states that repeated mental distress re-
actions are more likely to cause physical injury than one such
stimulus.50
Other cases have stated a similar rule to that expressed in
Grant, however, and those courts which award damages for injury
caused by fear wrongfully caused by defendant seem to limit the
situation to fear or severe psychic stimuli.
51
In Grant v. Gwynn,52 the court refused to accept defendant's
theory. We cannot tell what evidence the defendant was able to
produce, but it seems strange that the court was so dogmatic in
refusing damages when it has been quite liberal in allowing mental
distress damages resulting from breach of contract or damages
based on similar actions.
The type of mental distress causation is the same, i.e. mental
distress bordering on worry, which in turn reacts upon the neurotic
disposition of the individual to produce injury.
A key to this puzzle may be found in Hall v. Jackson.5 3 This
case is often quoted in cases containing elements of mental distress
claims, whether the claims relate to physical injury or contract.
The court limited its decision to an action for breach of contract,
against a defendant not engaged in business of a quasi-public
nature, to recover substantial damages founded only upon mental
anguish, humiliation and distress of mind. The breach was un-
attended by physical injury to the party bringing the action. There
49 Note 41 supra, at 288.
50 Note 38, supra, at 90.
51 C.f. Rasmussen v. Benson, 133 Neb. 449, 275 N.W. 674 (1937) Damages were allowed on
showing a fear, but court stated worry would not bring forth the same judgment.
52 Note 47 supra.
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was an absence of wanton or willful conduct on the part of the
breaching party.
In a further analysis of the rule for awarding damages for
mental distress, the court makes three classifications of cases.
a. In cases of pure tort, where no contractual relation
exists and the acts complained of are attended with will-
ful and wanton conduct on the part of defendant, sub-
stantial damages may be recovered for mental anguish
and suffering only, though no physical injury or pecu-
niary losses (are) suffered by plaintiff.
b. In cases where a breach of contract has occurred and the
acts attending such breach are accompanied by willful,
insulting or wanton conduct of the one guilty of the
breach, substantial damages may be recovered for mental
suffering only.
c. In cases where a breach of contract has taken place and
the one committing the breach was not engaged in busi-
ness of a quasi-public nature, and the negligence con-
sisted of a mere passable breach, unintentional, and un-
accompanied by any acts of wantoness, willfulness or
insult, on the part of the one committing the breach, an
action for substantial damages, founded alone upon men-
tal anguish and suffering, cannot be sustained; the rule
stated being predicated, of course, upon the absence of a
statute on the subject.
5 4
In the above classifications the situation of injury caused by
fright because of defendant's mere negligence is conspicuously
absent. Nor is it included in further classifications listed by the
court where damages for mental anguish may be given.
Mental distress damages may be awarded where:
1. By the merely negligent act of the defendant, physical
injury has been sustained, and in this class of cases they
are compensatory and the reason given for their allow-
ance is that the one cannot be separated from the other.
2. Breach of marriage contract.
3. In the cases of willful wrong especially those affecting
the liberty, character, reputation, personal security or
domestic relations of the injured party.55
The court then added that if the people of the state think it is
wise for damages for mental distress for other than those reasons
listed above be given, they should urge the legislature to take
action.
It was twelve years before the Hall case was broadened. In
1925, Westesen v. Olathe State Bank,56 plaintiff brought action for
damages for breach of contract stating that defendant bank agreed
to lend the plaintiff money for a trip to-California by crediting his
account with such sums as he might need after reaching his des-
tination. When plaintiff arrived in California, defendant refused to
honor his checks. The trial court permitted damages for humilia-
tion and mental suffering, and defendant brings error.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.
56 78 Colo. 217, 240 Pac. 689 (1925).
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The supreme court distinguished the Hall case and, quoting
from 17 C.J. 828, said:
Mental pain and suffering in connection with a wrong
which apart from such pain and suffering constitutes a
cause of action is a proper element of damages where it is
the natural and proximate consequence of the wrong.
5 7
Thus, the court broadened the contract classification to include
situations where there was a wrong, which produced mental an-
guish even though there existed no willful or wanton conduct.
Two later cases, Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n5s and
McCreery v. Millers Groceteria Co.,5 9 were decided reaffirming that
Colorado would allow damages for mental distress caused by
breach of contract when such breach was accombanied by willful
or wanton conduct. This rule was stated in the Hall case, supra, as
classification two. However, the court stated further that even if the
breach was not of willful or wanton nature, nominal damages could
be awarded for mental distress caused by the breach. This latter
statement would seem to limit the rule laid down in the Westesen
case to nominal damages rather than substantial damages.
Colorado has limited damages in wrongful death actions to
pain and suffering of the deceased caused by the injury, but those
suffered by the survivors of the deceased are not compensable. 60
Finally, Colorado allows substantial damages for mental distress
caused by willful insulting language of employees of common
carriers. Such special burden placed upon the common carrier is
the general rule,61 and courts go far in following it. This may be
demonstrated by Bleeker v. Colorado & So. R.R.62 in which the
court stated that it was basing its decision on breach of contract,
but insinuated that common carriers have a special duty to those
depending on its service and thus are placed in a special category
for breach of common courtesy.
The action was brought for damages for mental suffering
caused by insulting language of the conductor. The court first
established the duty of a carrier to the plaintiff which, the court
said, "included protection against the misconduct of employees."
In refuting the defendant's claim that damages cannot be given
for misconduct of employees, the court stated:
For a breach of the contract of carriage as the result of
a conductor assaulting a passenger without provocation,
the authorities are practically unanimous in holding that
for insulting language caused in connection with the as-
sault, damages for mental suffering caused thereby may
be recovered. If damages are recoverable for a breach of
the contract in one instance, there is no good reason why a
breach of such contract, as the result of using insulting
57 Id. at 219, 240 Pac. 690.
58 In Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535 (1932), plaintiff con-
tracted with defendant mortuary to bring plaintiff's deceased husband's body from Walden to
Denver and prepare it for burial. There was to be no publicity or notoriety. Defendant took pictures
of the body being unloaded from the airplane and published it in two newspapers.
59 In McCreery v. Miller's Groceteria Co., 99 Colo. 499, 64 P.2d 803 (1937), plaintiff brought
action for damages resulting from defendant's unauthorized use of plaintiff's photograph for
advertising purposes, after plaintiff expressly told defendant it could not be used.
60 See Lehrer v. Lorenzen, 124 Colo. 17, 233 P.2d 382 (1951).
61 Prosser, Torts, 40-41 (2d ed. 1955).
6250 Colo. 140, 114 Pac. 481 (1911).
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language, should not give a right of action independent of
other acts which may constitute a breach.
63
This case was decided before Hall v. Jackson, supra, but con-
tains much more liberal ideas. Perhaps, if the court would have
continued in the vein of thought expressed by the court in the
above case, i.e., "damages resulting from mental suffering . . . are
difficult of ascertainment, but the same is true in a greater or lesser
degree, in all actions brought to recover unliquidated damages,"
Colorado could have been placed among the more modern courts
in this field long before now.
IV. PROJECTION
No case involving injury by fright has reached the Supreme
Court of Colorado so it is necessary to hypothesize what Colorado
will do when the court does have such a case by drawing indica-
tions from cases in related fields. This is difficult when the court
seemingly takes a step forward and then a half step backward.
It leads to confusion and uncertainty, but Colorado is not alone
in this. 64
in 1911, the Colorado Supreme Court decided Hall v. Jackson,
supra, following the majority rule at that time, i.e., there could
be no award for injury resulting from mental distress (fright)
unless there was physical impact. Today, the rule followed in
that 1911 case is no longer the majority rule, nor is it an equitable
rule. as science has advanced to such a remarkable refinement
that there can generally be little doubt that physical injury may
be caused by fright.
The supreme court has recognized this development in medical
knowledge which resulted in a change in legal thought on the
subject in the recent case of Valley Development Co. v. Weeks.6 5
Although the facts of the case indicated that plaintiff should not
be awarded damages for her mental distress which allegedly caused
her injury, the court, in a very lengthy and detailed decision by
Mr. Justice Sutton, discusses the changing law in relation to award-
ing damages for injury caused by mental distress. 6 After pointing
out that the case in issue, which involved trespass on property,
not person, fell without the three classifications in the Hall case,
the court stated:
Hall also points out that "It may be said with safety
that at common law no action could be maintained to re-
cover for mental suffering in the absence of bodily injury
occasioning such suffering." The law has moved from that
position far forward today as the authorities referred to
testify.
67
Although this decision insists on staying within the ancient rules
laid down in the Hall case, it does indicate the court may not
63 Id. at 146, 114 Pac. at 483.
64 "The case law in the field here treated is in an almost unparalleled state of confusion and
any attempt at a consistent exegesis of the authorities is likely to break down in embarrassed
perplexity." 64 A.L.R.2d 103.
65 147 Cola. 591, 364 P.2d 730 (1961).
66 Plaintiff brought action against the Development Co. for deprivation of plaintiff's right to
water from a ditch that hod run across defendant's land before development. The court allowed
compensation for actual damage but found that plaintiff's mental distress stemmed from an earlier
condition.
67 Note 65 supra at 599, 364 P.2d at 734.
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believe that in situations where injury resulted from fright, it
would follow that case.
Why have the courts departed from that rule which denies
damages in such situations? Our discussion to this point indicates
that there are many situations today similar to the one where
injury results from fright, and where the courts have for many
years given substantial damages. Now we shall look specifically
at the reasons for the change in courts' reasoning in relation to
this field of personal right actions.
A careful and revealing analysis of the Coultas and Mitchell
cases was done by Hubert Winson Smith.68 He feels that there are
three basic reasons for refusing damages. (1) That since fright
caused by negligence is not itself a cause of action, none of its
consequences can give rise to a cause of action, (2) that the dam-
ages resulting from fright are too remote, and (3) that it is con-
trary to public policy to allow recovery of damages for personal
injuries resulting from fright.6 9
This same reasoning was used in Hall v. Jackson, supra. An
analysis of these reasons, however, shows certain weaknesses
which should be overcome.
The first reason appears to run afoul of the maxim "for every
wrong, a remedy." It is settled that when a bodily injury occurs
as a result of another's negligence, all resulting mental and physical
damage is compensable. Why, then, when the injury occurs solely
through mental distress should a cause of action be precluded?
In answer to the second reason, medical authorities say such
damages are not remote. Laboratory experiments and observa-
tions over fifty years, including two world wars and the Korean
war have established to a certainty that there is an essential inter-
relationship between physical organisms and the mental or emo-
tional. Thus, severe shock to one reacts upon the other.
70
When an individual is subject to a severe psychic stimulus,
physical lesions or functional disorders are actually produced.
68 Smith, Relation of Emotions to Injury and Disease, 30 Va. L. Rev. 200, 206 (1944).
69 Smith, op. cit. supra at 215.
70 Id. at 217. (Some authorities disagree.)
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This is especially true when occurring over a period of time. The
article by Hubert W. Smith lists7' systems or organs of the body
known at that time to react physiologically to a single stimulus
resulting in fear and rage. The two emotions are listed together
because they react upon the mental and physical systems similarly
and to the same degree. Also listed are 12 different recognized dis-
eases that might be caused by such a stimulus along with symptoms
which in turn might develop into other diseases.
Besides these physiological ailments, an individual may develop
psychological disturbances which result in physiological complaints.
These may eventually develop into actual physiological ailments.
Dr. Winfred Overholser speaks of these ailments after discussing
the possibility of direct effect upon the physical and organic sys-
tems.
There is a considerable group of disturbances of per-
sonality, however, in which we now consider the causation
to be primarily psychologic. This includes the entire group,
for example, of what are known as the neuroses or the psy-
choneuroses . . . . As for physical symptoms of neurosis,
they are legion. There may be anesthesia (loss of sensation),
blindness or deafness, loss of voice (aphonia), or paralysis
in what is known as the conversion type of neurosis, for-
merly referred to as hysteria. There may, too, be tremors,
or even attacks of unconsciousness with convulsions. In the
conversion neurosis, it is usually the sensory or motor sys-
tems which are affected. In others of the neuroses the
alimentary system is predominantly affected instead, so
that we may find painful symptoms referable to almost any
system of the body such as the gastro-intestinal tract,
the circulatory or genito-urinary sysem, the skin, and so
on .... The importance of this group of symptoms in the
so-called traumatic neuroses, that is neuroses which ap-
pear at least to have been precipitated by a physical injury,
or an emotional shock, is considerable. It should not be
thought that merely because the symptom, painful or
otherwise is psychologically determined, it is imaginary,
or non-existent. The complaints are painfully real; they
do not respond well to physical treatment, except so far as
that is suggestive therapy, but call for psychologic treat-
ment instead.
72
Laboratory experiments have discovered that actual lesion
may develop from psychic stimuli. Skin diseases, ulcers, blisters
etc. may develop.73 How, then, with this scientific evidence, can
a court of law decide that any damage is not the direct result of
psychic stimuli?
Perhaps the most difficult barrier for the courts to hurdle
before awarding damages for injury caused by psychic stimuli
is public policy. The difficulty lies in understanding the courts'
reasoning when a decision is made to rest upon public policy.
Here there may be real justification for barring damages on
public policy grounds.
71 Ibid.
72 Overholser, The Psychiatrist and the Law, 29-30 (1953).
73 Smith, op. cit. supra at 213.
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Judge Black of Indiana said:
We think it cannot be properly said that such injuries
are imaginary or conjectural or that the sufferings de-
scribed are not real nor does it seem to us proper today
that they cannot be regarded as directly and naturally re-
sulting from the act of the defendant as their proximate
cause, but not every injurious effect of wrong can form
the basis of damage.
Many ill consequences follow from wrongs which prox-
imate effect for which the law cannot afford redress be-
cause of the inadequacies of methods and means of courts
to reach just and adequate results with sufficient certainty.
74
Judge Black speaks of the difficulty of proof; but there are
other reasons for which public policy is said to prevent awarding
damages for injury by fright. The question must be raised as to
how far the courts should extend the cause of action: to third
persons, to anyone within hearing distance of the accident, or to
only the immediate persons involved in the action?
These questions have been answered satisfactorily to the ma-
jority of the courts in some manner. In Colorado, many of the
answers can be seen in procedure and past decisions in related
fields. Judges and juries alike have been determining injuries
from slander, converting them into money awards, and doing a
satisfactory job for hundreds of years under our common law
system. The usual phrase used is: "Relief is not to be denied be-
cause the exact amount cannot be ascertained. ' '75 It is also doubtful
that, today, a plaintiff could successfully feign injuries of this
nature.
76
The final question raised by the public policy argument is
whether "the flood gates of litigation" will be opened. In the first
place, as said in the Battalla case, such a reason should not be used to
bar an individual with a rightful claim.7 7 In the second place, the for-
mula of proof in all negligence actions would seem adequate to
prevent such a flood of litigation from becoming so overwhelming.
The plaintiff in a civil action has the burden of proving by a
preponderance of substantial evidence the concurrent existence of
four terms of the formula: duty, dereliction, direct or proximate
causation and damages. Any one of these four, if found lacking,
will defeat plaintiff's cause. If the courts open the door to an action
for damages caused by fright, it does not have to throw open the
door to all claims based on such fright unless these four elements
are present. No one has gone so far as to recommend that every
person has a right not to be emotionally disturbed. Of course our
modern day pace of living would not permit such a recommenda-
tion, but surely it would not deny an individual who has a genuine
claim, based upon defendant's proven negligency, a deserving
remedy.
74 Kolen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R. Co., 18 Ind. App. 202, 47 N.E. 694, 63 Am.St.Rep. 343 (1897).
75 Bullerdick v. Pritchard, 91 Cola. 276, 8 P.2d 705 (1932). See also Nebraska Drillers Inc. v.
Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 123 F. Supp. 678, 682 (1953); Southern Colo. Power Co. v. Pestana,
80 Colo. 375, 251 Pac. 224, (1926).
76 Goodrich, Emotional Disturbance as -Legal Damage, 20 Mich. L. Rev. 497, 509. See also,
Bohlon, Fifty Years of Torts, 50 Harv. L. Rev. 725 (1961).
77 Botalla v. State, 10 N.Y.2d 237, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1961).
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V. CONCLUSION
Justice is the constant desire and effort to render every
man his due.
Justinian
This paper, of necessity leaves many questions unanswered.
How far should the doctrine of damages for injury caused by fright
be expanded? Should all within a certain circle of danger be al-
lowed to bring an action against the negligent actor? Should a
parent be awarded damages for fright caused by fear for his child
in turn caused by the negligent act of defendant? These questions
are being answered in courts of the United States and England
today, but would require another paper to discuss properly.78
Medical science is not a certain science today, and of course
there will be many times when doctors disagree as to proximate
causation of plaintiff's injury; this is not a new dilemma to courts.
That the problem has arisen in our courts today, as a result of
not allowing damages for injury caused by frights, is also of imme-
diate consequence, tending to minimize any problem that arises
as a result of embarrassing the doctrine. Besides the inequity to
the injured plaintiff caused by fear alone, in other situations courts
look for the smallest trauma to base the defendan's action upon,
and upon finding it, often allow an uncalled for amount of damages.
This is as unjust as not allowing any damages at all.
Finally, it is not only proven that psychic stimuli causes in-
jury in some cases, it is also proven that there are some individuals
predisposed to this type of injury to a greater extent than others.
Should a cracked vase be worth as much as a whole one? Perhaps,
foreseeability is the answer to this question, but proof is another
that should be taken into consideration on the part of defendant.
Some have said that courts should use the average man to
determine if the psychic stimuli would have caused the injury and
to what extent damages should be awarded. 79
Thus, it cannot be said that there are no problems involved
in this field any longer. That would be hypocritical and show a
severe case of naivete.
However, courts are being hypocritical in not allowing a plain-
tiff a cause of action in deserving situations, and narrow in ignoring
medical advancements, new theories and trends in law.
78 See 18 A.L.R.2d 221.
79 Courts should also keep in mind the difference between activating a latent disease, and
compounding a present disease or condition.
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THE DISCOVERY REQUIREMENT IN MINING LAW,
CAN IT BE SATISFIED BY GEOPHYSICAL DATA?
By CARL L. SANDSTROM*
On August 6, 1945, President Harry S. Truman, then returning
to the United States from the Potsdam conference, electrified the
world with the announcement that 16 hours earlier an atomic bomb
had been dropped in Hiroshima, Japan. Since that date discoveries
and developments in the field of nuclear science, together with the
strained international situation created by the Cold War, have made
the raw materials from which atomic energy is derived a vital na-
tional resource. As a result there has been an overwhelming increase
in prospecting for these radioactive minerals.
History books, movies, and in more recent years, television,
have done much to create an image of the prospector of the early
West. The prospector of the uranium boom, however, differs consid-
erably from his counterpart of the "good old days." The passage of
time has brought improvements not only to his equipment but to
his technique. The same cannot be said, however, for the statutes
governing his prospecting activities. They have remained substan-
tially unchanged and the courts have been faced with the task of
fitting new techniques into a framework of old regulations. The
resulting situation was aptly described by the Nevada Supreme
Court when it stated:
The problem is old in a new setting. The rush to a new
strike and the scramble for the most desirable location.
Today the magic word is uranium; the scintillator and the
mineral lamp have taken the place of the prospector's tools;
the airplane and the four-wheel drive truck have reduced
factors of time and distance. The plot, the drama, however,
remain essentially the same; the rush, the location, the
overlapping of claims, the discovery of values, the dispute
and in the orderly resolution of the dispute the principles
of law remain unchanged from the days of the Mother Lode
and Comstock.'
One of the essentials of this regulatory framework is a "discov-
ery of valuable mineral" to establish a valid location on land of the
public domain. 2 The discovery of mineral is the cornerstone of the
location, the foundation of title, and no right exists until such dis-
covery is made.3 Although the statutes clearly state that discovery
is required,4 nowhere do they define the term nor state what is
necessary to satisfy it. Thus, it has been left for the courts to decide
what constitutes a "valid discovery." Though the problem has been
treated in numerous cases, no very precise test had been laid down
even before the development of radiometric prospecting devices.
* Attorney, Chief Counsel's Office, Atomic Energy Commission, Las Vegas, Nevada. The views
expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Atomic Energy
Commission.
1 Berto v. Wilson, 74 Nev. 128, 324 P.2d 843 (1958).
2 Rev. Stat. § 2320 (1875), 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1952).
3 2 Lindley, Mines, § 335 (3d ed. 1914).
4 See note 2, supra.
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The utilization of these newly developed instruments and tech-
niques created additional problems and brought about an increased
need for either a more exact test or standard to be used by the courts
or a legislative revamping of the statutes governing this matter.
The fundamental issue in cases involving discovery of radio-
active minerals has been the extent to which radiometric findings
by Geiger counter, scintillator, or allied devices can be relied on by
the locator. The purpose of this article is to examine the results of
several recently decided cases and determine whether the courts
in these cases have established a standard that can be used and
relied on by persons locating claims for radioactive minerals.
I. THE DISCOVERY REQUIREMENT
The discovery requirement in mining law is a matter of basic
policy and one that is firmly rooted in history. In all ages and all
countries discovery has been regarded as conferring rights or claims
as a reward.5 The prospector went forth in search of minerals ac-
companied by a promise of reward. When a discovery was made the
discoveror was granted the use of a segment of land and the right
to remove minerals from that land. Discovery was the condition
precedent to the reward.6
Prior to the enactment of the mining statutes by the United
States, the rules and regulations of the California mining camps
recognized discovery as essential to establishing a valid claim. 7
When the government acted to formalize the practices of the mining
camps, a provision requiring discovery was included and basic min-
ing law today contains the same provision: no location can exist
until after discovery of mineral within the boundaries of the claim
has occurred.8
The federal government, by this statutory framework regu-
lating location, has established a method by which property rights,
through a patent, can be acquired in a portion of the public domain.
The purpose of such a plan is to facilitate the development of the
natural resources of the nation. The function of discovery is to
insure the government the benefit it seeks, i.e., development of its
mineral wealth and at the same time discourage the bad faith
locator. It is the good faith locator who has made a valid discovery
of valuable mineral and who desires to further develop that dis-
covery who will be rewarded and not the individual who, under the
guise of a good faith locator, but with no discovery, attempts to
obtain title to the land."
That the law requires a discovery of valuable mineral for a
valid location is clear. The reason or purpose for such a requirement
is also clear. There is a lack of such clarity, however, when it comes
to what constitutes a "valid discovery." Nowhere do the statutes
define the term nor state what is required to satisfy it. Since ques-
5 See note 3, supro.
6 1 Lindley, Mines, 5-38 (3d ed. 1914).
7 O'Reilly v. Campbell, 116 U.S. 418 (1885); Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453 (1878); Marshall v.
Harvey Peak Tin Co., I S.D. 350, 47 N.W. 290 (1890); 1 Lindley, Mines, 43 (3d ed. 1914).
8 17 Stat. 91 (1872); 30 U.S.C. § 23 (1952). State statutes customarily contain the same require-
ment, e.g. Wyo. Stats. § 30-6 (1957).
Wasky v. Hammer, 223 U.S. 85 (1912); Shoshone Min. Co. v. Ritter, 87 Fed. 801 (9th Cir. 1898);
Long v. Robinson, 148 Fed. 799 (9th Cir. 1906).
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tions of discovery have been held to be questions of fact,10 it has
been left to the courts to determine from the evidence presented in
each case whether the requirement has been met. Considerable liti-
gation on this subject through the years has resulted in the evolu-
tion of the so-called "rule of discovery" which states: In order for
a location to be valid there must be a discovery of mineral under
such circumstances and of such character as would justify a person
of ordinary prudence in the further expenditure of time and money
with a reasonable prospect of success in developing a profitable
mine." Federal and state courts as well as the Department of In-
terior have accepted this as the general rule to be applied in deter-
mining the validity of a discovery.
12
It can readily be seen that this rule is neither the epitome of
exactness nor specificity. That courts have applied it with varying
degrees of liberal or strict construction is not surprising. The result
is widely varying pronouncements as to what evidence of discovery
is sufficient to allow a prudent man the further expenditure of time
and money to develop his claim. The Supreme Court in the Chris-
man case 1 3 said that there must be "reasonable evidence of the fact
either that there is a vein or lode carrying the precious mineral, or
if it can be claimed as a placer that it is valuable for such mining."
What constitutes "reasonable evidence" is a question of fact upon
10 United States v. Ohio Oil Co., 240 Fed. 996 (D. Wyo. 1916).
11 Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450 (1920); Chrisman v. Miller, 197 U.S. 313 (1905).
12 Castle v. Womble, 19 L.D. 455; Jefferson v. Montana Copper Mines Co., 41 L.D. 320 (1912).
13 Chrisman v. Miller, see note 11 supro, at 323.
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which equally learned courts and juries have reached conflicting
conclusions.
What, then, will the courts accept as "reasonable evidence" of
a valid discovery? As in certain other areas of the law a better idea
of what will be accepted can be obtained by considering some of the
evidences which the courts have in the past rejected. This is espe-
cially true when considering the problem of whether data obtained
from geophysical instruments will be accepted as "reasonable evi-
dence" to prove valid discovery of radioactive minerals. Certain of
these holdings as to what does not constitute a valid discovery have
mitigated against acceptance of geological and/or geophysical evi-
dence as sufficient proof of the discovery of valuable mineral.
In United States v. Iron and Silver Mining Co., 14 the United
States Supreme Court, in 1888, rendered an important decision on
this point. In that case the court commented as follows on the
sufficiency of the discovery evidence there presented:
It is not enough that there may have been some indica-
tion by outcroppings on the surface, of the existence of
lodes or veins of rock in place bearing gold or silver or
other metal, to justify their designation as "known" veins
or lodes. To meet that designation the lodes or veins must
be clearly ascertained, and be of such extent as to render
the land more valuable on that account, and justify ex-
ploitation.15
Following this early pronouncement by the Court there fol-
lowed a series of rulings which have since been cited and quoted in
nearly every discussion involving the discovery requirement. This
series of cases established the rule that mere indications of valuable
mineral, however strong, are insufficient16 and that it is the actual
finding of the mineral in rock in place, as distinguished from float
rock, that constitutes the discovery. 17 Also, evidence which merely
suggests a possibility that valuable mineral may, on subsequent ex-
ploration, be found to contain ore of great value has been held
unacceptable.1 " The Supreme Court stated with some emphasis and
considerable clarity in King v. Amy Silversmith Mining Co.:" "Lo-
cations resting simply on conjectural or imaginary existence of a
vein or lode within their limits shall not be allowed. A location can
rest only upon an actual discovery of a vein or lode.
'20
Thus the rule that only an actual physical exposure of valuable
mineral within the limits of the claim would satisfy the discovery
requirement.21 This rule and its application to unexposed deposits
based on surface indications and geological deductions has been
summarized as follows:
Title to the claims is sought essentially on account of
their possible value for certain unexposed deposits supposed
to exist a considerable depth beneath the surface, and hay-
14 128 U.S. 673 (1888).
15 Id. at 683 (Emphasis added).
16 Iron Silver Co. v. Mike & Starr Co., 143 U.S. 394 (1892).
17 Book v. Justice Mining Co., 58 Fed. 105 (D. Nev. 1893); Dalten v. Clark, 129 Cal. App. 136,
18 P.2d 752 (1933).
18 Chrisman v. Miller, note 11, supro; Iron Silver Co. v. Mike & Starr Co., note 16, supra; United
States v. Mobley, 45 F. Supp. 407 (S.D. Cal. 1942).
19 152 U.S. 222 (1894).
20 Id. at 227 (Emphasis added).
21 2 Lindley, Mines, § 336 (3d ed. 1914); Miller v. Chrisman, 140 Cal. 440, 73 Pac. 1083 (1903);
Whiting v. Stroup, 17 Wyo. 1, 95 Pac. 849 (1908).
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ing no connection, as far as shown, with any deposits
appearing on the surface. The exposure, however, of sub-
stantially worthless deposits on the surface of a claim; the
finding of mere surface indications of mineral within its
limits; the discovery of valuable mineral deposits outside
the claim; or deductions from established geological facts
relating to it; one or all of which matters may reasonably
give rise to a hope or belief, however strong it might be,
that valuable mineral deposit exists within the claim, will
neither suffice as a discovery thereon, nor be entitled to be
accepted as the equivalent thereof.
22
The Court, in the case of Nevada Sierra Oil Co. v. Home Oil
Co., 23 refused to accept the sufficiency of discovery evidence based
on geological inferences and deductions and made the statement
that since indications of a thing are not the thing itself, mere indi-
cations of a mineral cannot constitute a valid discovery.
2 4
An excellent analysis and review of this entire point is given
by Lindley in his work on the Law of MinesY
5
II. STATE LAW DiscovERY REQUIREMENTS
State laws governing the location and recording of mining
claims on the public domain are a valid exercise of the regulatory
authority permitted under the mining laws.2 6 However, such laws
are valid only to the extent that they are not inconsistent with the
federal laws.27 Therefore, while state law may impose additional
burdens on the locator of a mining claim by way of requiring addi-
tional development or discovery work,28 such laws cannot alter the
minimum requirements of the federal law.29
III. RECENT COURT DECISIONS
It has been mentioned before that the purpose of the actual
physical discovery requirement before a mining claim is validly
located is to prevent the government from being defrauded. An-
other reason is to protect the prospector against wholesale segrega-
tion of mineral land by locators of spurious claims. It is because of
this that the courts have refused to accept geological evidence as
sufficient to satisfy the discovery requirement of the law. Such evi-
dence has been viewed as merely indicative of the presence of
mineral and as the Court stated in the Nevada Sierra Oil Co. case,3 0
must be rejected since mere indications of mineral do not constitute
discovery of the mineral itself.
The radioactive properties of uranium have made geophysical
prospectors out of almost everyone who can get a Geiger counter or
a scintillator. However, it would seem that such geophysical evi-
dence of the presence of radioactive minerals is in no better position
than strictly geological findings as proof of discovery under the
22 East Tintic Consolidated Claims, 40 L.D. 271, 274 (1911).
2398 Fed. 673 (1899).
24 Cited in Whiting v. Stroup, note 21, supra.
25 See note 3, supra.
26 17 Stat. 92; 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1952).
27 Kendall v. Son Juan Silver Mining Co., 144 U.S. 658 (1892).
28 Erhardt v. Boara, 113 U.S. 527 (1885).
29 Northmore v. Simmons, 97 Fed. 386 (1899); Saxten v. Perry, 47 Colo. 263, 107 Pac. 281 (1910).
30 See note 23, supra.
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mining laws. At least this would be a necessary conclusion from
the judicial precedents recorded over the past 75 years. The several
recent cases discussed below involving such evidence of discovery
should, therefore, be of more than casual interest to persons inter-
ested or involved in mining law and especially to those interested
in uranium claims.
The first of these cases, Smaller v. Leach,"I was decided by the
Colorado Supreme Court on October 14, 1957. Discovery was not an
issue in the case but rather it dealt with the validity of a grubstake
agreement based on loan of a scintillator for uranium prospecting.
In the decision, Justice Sutton, speaking for the court, attacked
the practice being used by uranium prospectors wherein large areas
were staked without compliance to the mining law in hopes that
later legal discoveries would validate these claims. He concluded
this "dicta" with the following comment on the absence of either
state or federal legislation that would allow geophysical evidence as
the basis for valid discoveries:
.This court recognizes that no Colorado nor Federal
legislation has yet been enacted to expressly provide for the
atomic era in radioactive mineral locating. No such laws
exist expressly providing that valid discoveries can be made
by radio detection devices, possibly because of the newness
of the subject, or, because of fear of defective instrument,
fraudulent claims, mistakes which may arise, the difficulty
of determining on the ground as to whether a claim has
been validated by discovery, or because not all radio-active
areas are in fact valuable. It also appears that uranium
itself at times may be "inbalance"; viz., not giving off any
count or that count may be different than the chemical
assay, which is the conclusive test.'
2
The Colorado Supreme Court in this decision indicated that it
would not accept as valid a mineral discovery based on geophysical
evidence but would treat such data as mere indications of mineral
and not the mineral itself.
Shortly after the Leach case was decided, the Wyoming Su-
preme Court was confronted with the problem that the Colorado
court had refered to in Leach but did not have to answer, i.e., can
there be a valid discovery of mineral based on geophysical data?
31 136 Colo. 297, 316 P.2d 1030 (1957).
32 Id. at 307, 316 P.2d at 1037.
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That was the question before the Wyoming court in Globe Mining
Co. v. Anderson.
33
In that suit, Globe Mining Co. brought an action to quiet title
to ten lode mining claims located on the public domain. Globe had
discovered a highly radioactive anomaly by means of an airborne
scintillator. The area containing this anomaly was then examined
on foot, the geology determined, and a radioactive count of 2 to 7
times background obtained on all claims. Samples were taken from
three of the claims and chemical assays of the samples disclosed
uranium. Globe then performed the other location requirements
and hired a person to do some work on the claims. Approximately
two years later Anderson entered and located in the same area,
overlapping some of the Globe claims.
The Wyoming Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Parker,
held that Globe had valid claims on only the three claims from
which the chemical assays had been taken, that on the remaining
claims there was no valid discovery and Globe was not entitled to
possession, and that Globe could not question Anderson's attempt
to establish valid claims. As to the seven remaining claims there
was no evidence of sampling or assaying of a "vein, lode, or rock
in place" which prompted the court to say:
Thus there was no evidence of a sampling and assaying
of a vein, lode, or rock in place in Phil #3, 4, 7, 9, 10, 11,
and 12, and, therefore, no discovery on those claims-unless
we recognize the readings of electrical instruments such as
scintillators and Geiger counters as sufficient to support
discovery. This we are reluctant to do, since such counters
while helpful in prospecting for uranium cannot be relied
on as the only test. For instance the plaintiffs' witness
Grant, testifying about his general investigation of the sub-
ject, said that in certain areas where the background count
was high an assay showed no uranium. To the same effect
see Ninninger, Minerals for Atomic Energy, 2d ed. pp. 37
and 73. Thus with the exception of Phil #5, 6, 8 there is
no evidence in the record on which to base discovery of a
vein, lode, or mineral bearing rock in place within the limit
of any Phil claim. This is required by both the Federal and
the Wyoming statute relating to lode claims, and the plain-
tiff is obligated to sustain the burden of proof in that
respect.
34
The Wyoming court thus concluded that geophysical evidence
in the form of favorable radiometric showings does not alone suffice
to comply with the statutory requirement that "mining claims upon
veins or lodes of quartz or other rock in placebearing ... valuable
deposits" cannot be validly located "until discovery of the vein or
lode within the limits of the claim is located." The court's statement
that scintillator or Geiger counter readings cannot be relied on as
the "only test" is significant, however, in that it indicates that al-
though such geophysical evidence "alone" is insufficient basis for a
valid discovery of mineral perhaps such evidence when accompa-
nied by other "indications" would be sufficient to meet the require-
33 78 Wyo. 17, 318 P.2d 373 (1957).
34 318 P.2d at 380.
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ment. Just what the court might require in addition to the geophysi-
cal information is not indicated.
Rummell v. Bailey,'3 5 decided by the Supreme Court of Utah,
was the first case to deviate from the position taken in the Leach
and Globe cases. There the court held that a discovery based on a
reaction from a Geiger counter, plus geological analysis of the im-
mediate area as well as the nature of nearby proven ore bodies was
valid. This was the first example of what a court might accept, in
addition to geophysical data, as reasonable evidence of a discovery.
From the comment of Justice Sutton in the Leach case it would
seem that the Colorado court felt that before geophysical evidence
could be accepted as satisfying the discovery requirement of the
mining law, new legislation would have to be passed permitting it.
For this reason the opinion of the Colorado court in Dallas v. Fitz-
simmons,3 6 decided some six months after Leach, was surprising.
The Dallas case involved three uranium claims located on state
land that was open to lease. Discovery on the claims was based on
Geiger counter readings from each claim and a chemical assay from
one of them. Dallas tried to buy the claims from Fitzsimmons, the
locator, and when Fitzsimmons refused to sell, Dallas leased the
land from the state and brought an action to eject Fitzsimmons as
a trespasser on the leased land. Fitzsimmons claimed a right to the
land because of valid lode claims and the trial court held for him.
This was affirmed by the Colorado Supreme Court.
First, it should be mentioned that the fact that the land involved
was state land rather than federal public domain does not alter the
importance of this case to mining law in general. This is true be-
cause of the jurisdiction resting in state courts to determine the
right to possession in controversies between rival mineral claimants,
and the similarity between the state and federal requirements. This
is especially true here since the court relied entirely on judicial
precedent which involved the public lands mining laws, and has
not indicated that its decision is predicated on any distinction be-
tween the discovery requirements of the state and federal mining
laws.
The court summarized the discovery evidence upon which the
three claims were based as follows:
There is evidence that uranium was found on each
claim by use of the Geiger counter. Assays of the claim
samples from one of the discovery pits showed chemical re-
sults up to 1.24% uranium and 0.4% vanadium according to
testimony objected to but not ruled on below.
The record and briefs carefully and ably detail the
lengthy history of just how defendants made this discovery
with a Geiger counter and later had samples from one of
the claims chemically assayed. The assays proved what the
Geiger counter indicated on the ground, i.e., mineralization
sufficient to constitute a "discovery" within the meaning of
our statute.
37
The court in justifying its conclusion that the chemical assay
35 7 Utah 2d 137, 320 P.2d 653 (1958).
36 137 Colo. 196, 323 P.2d 274 (1958).
37 Id. at 202, 203, 323 P.2d at 278 (Emphasis added).
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from the one claim, plus the Geiger counter readings from the
adjoining claims was enough to satisfy the discovery requirement
for each claim said:
Where as here the assay of samples from at least one
of the claims, and all the claims are contiguous, and where
the trial court could and did conclude from the evidence
that the non-assayed claims lie on similar ground, it is not
unrealistic to hold that competent radiometric reactions,
supported by a chemical assay as to part of the claims,
clearly show the presence of uranium on the adjacent
claimed location showing the same or similar radiometric
readings. The latter are then valid "discoveries" under our
statute as much as are outcrops visible to the naked eye.
Such other "discoveries," however, must be capable of
competent radiometric delineation in similar rock in place
or along the same vein or lode. See Smaller v. Leach,
136 Colo. 297, 313 P. 2d 1030, for a discussion of radiometric
discoveries; and compare Rummell v. Bailey, 1958, 7 Utah
2d 137, 320 P. 2d 653, and Globe Mining Co. v. Anderson,
Wyo. 318 P. 2d 373.
Keeping in mind that technical prospecting methods,
such as the use of counters and scintillators, are only ex-
ploration tools and not complete exploration and discovery
systems, we hold that here radiometric results coupled
with the other evidence, such as assay and type of rock in
place show an overall fair compliance with the statute
requiring discovery.
38
Justice Hall, in his dissent to the Dallas opinion disputes the
majority belief that this conclusion is not "unrealistic." The dissent
expresses the belief that the majority opinion is revolutionary in
the result it reaches as far as the discovery requirement of the
mining law is concerned. In his dissent Justice Hall said:
I respectfully submit that a Geiger counter, no matter
what its reading may be, does not prove mineral in place.
Without discovery of mineralized rock in place there can
be no valid location of a lode claim, no matter what the
Geiger counter readings may be.
The effect of the majority opinion is to substitute for
proof of a discovery of mineral in place a mere possibility,
38 Id. at 204, 323 P.2d at 279 (Emphasis added).
?"""-- In the tradition
of craftsmanship
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probability or conjecture of mineral in place, and thus
judicially legislate that there need not be an actual and
proven discovery to have a valid claim.
The legal effect of the decision is to authorize unlimited
filings based on one actual legal discovery. If such a result
is desirable then it is a matter for the legislature and not
for the courts 9
A short time after the Dallas decision was rendered the Nevada
Supreme Court reached a similar result in the case of Berto v.
Wilson.40 The Nevada court held that the use of a scintillator and a
mineral light on outcrop samples plus the prior mining and prospect-
ing experience of the locator was sufficient to meet the discovery
requirements.
In the Globe case the Wyoming court intimated that although
geophysical data "alone" would not be accepted as proof of "valid
discovery," geophysical data plus something else might be accepted.
That this thought was in the mind of the Wyoming court is evi-
denced by its decision in the Western Standard case, 4' decided in
1960, three years after Globe.
The facts in Western Standard are as follows: On June 30,
1954, Thurston's predecessors in interest located and staked claims
XYZ #1-13 in the Gas Hills of Wyoming. The claims were located
on a trend discovered by considering the geology of the area and
by chemically assaying numerous samples taken from adjoining
and adjacent claims. At or shortly after location, discovery pits
were dug on all claims. Radiometric readings were taken in each
pit and each produced readings of 2-4 times background. Between
June 26 and July 2, 1957, a drill hole was completed on each claim .12
Each hole was probed with a radiometric device which recorded
emissions of rays from uranium ores. Samples of the cuttings of
each hole were taken but were not chemically assayed until after
the present case came to trial. Thurston's predecessors in interest
maintained possession of the claims from the time of location until
October 9 or 10, 1957, when agents of Western Standard Uranium
Co. entered thereon, posted location notices and commenced work,
claiming that the location of Thurston was void because of failure
to comply with Wyoming and Federal discovery statutes. Thurston
then brought a quiet title action which was decided in his favor in
both the trial court and the Wyoming Supreme Court.
Western Standard claimed on appeal that the facts were insuf-
ficient to sustain a finding of discovery and that the trial court
must have based its finding or discovery on radiometric readings
and conjecture. As authority for this contention Western Standard
Uranium Co. relied on the Globe case. The Wyoming Supreme Court
rejected this and distinguished this case from Globe in the following
manner:
There is no reason to conclude that the trial court based
its findings upon any particular one of these evidentiary
facts nor is there any reason to believe that the court
39 Id. at 207, 323 P.2d at 280 (Emphasis added).
40 See note 1, supra.
41 Western Standard Uranium Co. v. Thurston, 355 P.2d 377 (Wyo. 1960).
42 Drill holes were completed after passage of the Wyoming Drill Hole Law and were apparently
a precautionary measure on the part of Thurston's predecessors. See Wyo. Stats. § 30-6 (1957).
1963
DENVER LAW CENTER JOURNAL
should or did ignore the many combined pertinent facts
and factors which were disclosed by the plaintiff's showing
on the motion for summary judgment and which definitely,
on the facts herein, distinguishes this case from the Globe
case.
4 3
The court further explains in language that should earn for
it a warm spot forever in the hearts of geologists and geophysicists,
the reasoning behind its decision when it says:
It may be conceded that a discovery could not be based
on any one of the above facts but they are all relevant facts
which should be considered as component parts of an as-
semblage of physical facts which might and would "justify
a reasonably prudent man in expending money and effort
in further exploration or development." For this court to
rule otherwise would require it to adopt a position that a
man or men engaging in a specialized business can never
be a reasonably prudent man unless their methods and
operations follow the court's concept of the proper manner
of conducting their business and substituting the judgment
of the court for experts in their respective fields.
44
The court after referring to other cases that have treated this
same problem continues by saying:
While no case examined allows the predicating of a
discovery solely on radiometric readings, the importance
of such readings, when taken into consideration with other
facts and factors, is universally recognized. To fail to do
so is to deny progress or recognize that scientific tools by
continued use and experience can and usually do evolve
from unreliability to respected accuracy when properly
applied to their ultimate uses.
45
The result of this case is to declare valid claims in which there
was, at the time of location, no "actual discovery of mineral in rock
in place." There had been no chemical assays, until much later,
to show mineral content within the boundaries of the claims. The
entire discovery was based on what previously had been held to
be mere indications of mineral. Discovery evidence here consisted
of a trend discovered by application of geological theory and assays
taken from nearby claims known to contain uranium, Geiger coun-
ter readings from discovery pits on each claim, and the fact that the
discovery pits exposed a geological formation known to be the only
uranium bearing formation in the area. Radiometric well logs taken
some time after location and chemical assays of samples taken
from drill holes, which were not assayed until after the case had
gone to trial, were used by the court only as additional proof of
what the original discovery had already proven.
This case may well become a landmark case in the area of the
discovery requirement in mining law. It stands for the proposition
that geophysical evidences of minerals are no longer to be con-
sidered as "mere indications" of mineral but can, when accompanied
by other indications of mineral that substantiate the conclusions
derived from the geophysical evidence, be treated as equal to a
43 Id. at 382 (Emphasis added).
44 Id. at 382.
45 Id. at 382.
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finding of mineral in place in a vein or lode and thus be the basis
for a valid mineral discovery as required by state and federal
statutes.
IV. CONCLUSION
No longer is it absolutely essential to have an actual discovery
of mineral in place in a vein or lode in order to have a valid location.
At least this is true for location of lode claims for radioactive
minerals. A chronological examination of the cases treated'here
shows this to be true. In Smaller v. Leach,46 decided in 1957, the
Colorado court in some dicta in its opinion outlined the general
rule that mere indications cannot form the basis of a valid discovery
of mineral but rather there must be an actual discovery of mineral
in a vein or lode of rock in place. The court also stated in this dicta
that if this policy were to be changed, and the court indicated
that it felt it would have to be changed before geophysical evidence
could be used as a basis for a discovery, it would be for the legisla-
ture to change and not the courts.
Later in 1957, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in its Globe Min-
ing 47 decision, followed the general rule by refusing to allow claims
to stand in which there had been no actual discovery of mineral.
The court gave an indication of what was to come, however, when
it emphasized in its opinion that it would not accept as valid a
discovery in which geophysical data was the "only test" and that
geophysical data "alone" was not sufficient to support discovery.
Modification of the general rule requiring actual discovery of
mineral before there was valid discovery occurred when the Colo-
rado Supreme Court, in a decision that Justice Hall in his dissent
calls revolutionary, decided the Dallas case 48 early in 1958. In that
case the court apparently forgot the belief it expressed earlier in
Smaller v. Leach,49 that the job of changing the discovery require-
ment so as to permit the use of geophysical data belonged to the
legislature and did a bit of legislating on its own. The court most
certainly was influenced by the Wyoming and Utah courts as the
opinion refers to both the Globe and Rummell decisions.5 0 The court
in effect agreed with the Globe case and held that geophysical
evidence alone is not enough to establish a valid discovery, but
geophysical evidence plus something else is enough. The Colorado
court said that "something else" must be a valid physical discovery
of mineral in place on at least one of the claims in question and
that the other claims from which no assays are obtained must be
in similar rock or along the same vein or lode as the one from
which the assay has been obtained. The court concluded that with
that combination of facts it is not unrealistic to hold there is
compliance with the discovery statutes.5 1
The final step in this transition was taken by Wyoming in the
Western Standard case.52 That decision was the "coup de grace" of
46 See note 31, supra.
47 See note 33, supro.
48 See note 36, supra.
49 See note 31, supra.
50 See note 38, supra.
51 See note 38, supro.
52 See note 41. supro.
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the long adhered to and staunchly defended rule that where there
is no actual mineral present there is no discovery and its counter-
part that the indications of a thing no matter how strong are not
the thing itself and thus mere indications of mineral cannot con-
stitute a valid discovery.
In Western Standard the court went one step further than the
Colorado court had gone in Dallas. Dallas held that there had to be
at least one actual discovery of mineral in place, at least one of the
claims in question had to have a chemical assay showing mineral,
which the Colorado court had earlier stated was the conclusive
test. But Western Standard declared valid thirteen claims none of
which had had an assay made on a sample until well after the case
had gone to trial and then the court, in overruling a motion not to
allow entry of such assays as evidence, said that such assays only
corroborated the earlier discovery. The earlier discovery was based
entirely on evidence that would, under the rule of Nevada Sierra
Oil Co. v. Home Oil Co. 53 and other similar cases, have been classi-
fied as "mere indications." The discovery relied on in Western
Standard and declared valid by the Wyoming court was based on
Geiger counter readings, geological deductions, assays from neigh-
boring claims of proven worth, the fact that the geological forma-
tion cut by the discovery pits was known to be the only uranium
bearing formation in the area, and customs or practice of the miners
in the area.
The result of this case is a very practical one. The courts still
will not accept as valid discovery based entirely on geophysical
evidence. It is felt that not even the mining people would advocate
such a ruling as they, much more than the lawyers and judges, are
aware of the failings and shortcomings of these technical devices.
But, at the same time, information obtained by the use of such
instruments, which have over the years proven themselves to be
accurate the great majority of the time, should not be completely
ignored when corroborated by additional facts and indications. The
result of this case will allow such information to be used to prove
discovery.
Mining law has been criticized as outmoded and in need of
reform.54 It is contended that because of obsolete laws the mining
industry is prevented from fully utilizing modern technological
advancements. The modification of the mining law, resulting from
the decisions in these several recent cases should aid in removing
some of those obstructions, at least as regards discovery based on
geophysical data. It is felt that the Western Standard case will be-
come a landmark case in this area and provides an excellent indi-
cation of what it takes to establish a valid discovery of mineral when
the main evidence of such discovery is geophysical information.
This modification of the mining law should result in greater reliance
on geophysical and other scientific methods of discovery, greater
confidence in the legal validity of resulting discoveries, and thus a
greater benefit to the mineral industry and the country.
53 See note 23, supra.
54 Martz, Pick and ShoVel Mining Low in an Atomic Age: A Case for Reform, 27 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 375 (1955).
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